



State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta

2026

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Foreword

The safety management system (SMS) is a fundamental component of the aviation industry's operational framework. Maintaining high safety standards builds trust not only among users, but also across key stakeholders such as investors, employees, regulatory bodies and other authorities. Investing in strong safety systems is essential, not only to sustain safe day-to-day operations, but also to respond effectively during unforeseen or disruptive events.

As the aviation sector evolves, so do approaches to safety. Advances in data collection and analytical tools enable stakeholders to take a more proactive stance, whilst also enhancing their ability to respond to operational risks. Although aviation remains one of the safest modes of transport, recent years have presented significant challenges to SMS frameworks due to highly complex and unforeseen situations.

Documents such as the Malta State Plan for Aviation Safety, the European Plan for Aviation, and the Global Aviation Safety Programme all contribute towards the strengthening of an organisation's SMS. These set the foundation for a sound framework that can be further enhanced through risk-specific tools, thus enriching the overall safety risk management approach. Collectively, these resources offer comprehensive guidance to industry stakeholders, enabling effective risk assessment and supporting safe, resilient operations.

Ultimately, all stakeholders must remain vigilant within their operational environments by continuously identifying risks, implementing appropriate mitigations, and monitoring effectiveness as part of a robust and dynamic safety management system.

SPAS in Malta Amendment Record

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Third-party documents relevant to this Issue

- European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) 2026 Edition
- European Aviation Safety Programme
- ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP)
- Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Safety Management)

Revision Details

Issue No	Date	Details
01/2014	May 2014	Publication of TM-CAD State Safety Plan 2014-2017.
02/2020	December 2020	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2020-2024 to reflect MST actions published in EPAS 2020-2024. Specific actions from EPAS 2018-2022 and 2019-2023 were also included.
03/2021	November 2021	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2021-2025 to reflect MST actions published in EPAS 2021-2025, including specific actions from previous EPAS publications.
04/2022	November 2022	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2022-2026 to reflect MST actions published in EPAS 2022-2026, including specific actions from previous EPAS publications.
05/2023	July 2023	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2023-2025 to reflect MST actions published in EPAS 2023-2025, including specific actions from previous EPAS publications as applicable.
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08/2026	August 2026	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2026 to reflect MST actions published in the EPAS 2026 Edition, including specific actions from previous EPAS publications as applicable.

Abbreviations

ALoS	Acceptable Level of Safety
AOC	Air Operator's Certificate
ASR	Annual Safety Report
CA	Competent Authority
CAD	Civil Aviation Directorate
CAT	Commercial Air Transport
CFIT	Controlled Flight into Terrain
EASA	European Aviation Safety Agency
EC	European Commission
EPAS	European Plan for Aviation Safety
FDM	Flight Data Monitoring
FOD	Foreign Object Debris / Foreign Object Damage
GA	General Aviation
GCOL	Ground Collision
GH	Ground Handling
GHSP	Ground Handling Service Provider
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
KRA	Key Risk Area
LOC-I	Loss of Control In-flight
MAC	Mid-Air Collision
MOR	Mandatory Occurrence Report
MS	Member State
NCO	Non-Commercial Operations
NoA	Network of Analysts
RE	Runway Excursion
RI	Runway Incursion
RNO	Return to Normal Operations
SMM	Safety Management Manual
SMS	Safety Management System
SPAS	State Plan for Aviation Safety
SPAS in Malta	State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta
SPI	Safety Performance Indicator
SPO	Specialised Operations
SPT	Safety Performance Target
SSP	State Safety Programme
TM-CAD	Transport Malta Civil Aviation Directorate
UAS	Unmanned Aircraft Systems
USOAP CMA	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach

1. European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS)

The European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) is the instrument to prioritise and manage actions to maintain and further improve aviation safety and environmental protection, while ensuring efficiency, proportionality and a level playing field.

EPAS is the aviation safety action plan derived from the main safety risks identified at European level and a key element of the European aviation safety strategy. EPAS is built on a proactive approach to support the future growth of aviation while securing a high and uniform level of safety for all Member States (MSs). This proactive approach allows the European Commission (EC), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Member States to take the necessary actions at the right time in order to prioritise the risks to be managed and to face the challenges posed by the increasing complexity and continued growth in civil aviation, as well as to ensure safe, secure and environmentally friendly implementation of new business models and new technologies.

The overall safety objective is to maintain, and where feasible, further improve the current level of safety performance within the European aviation system in light of upcoming changes. Furthermore, EPAS is continuously reviewed and enhanced through annual updates. The plan forms an integral part of EASA's work programme and is developed in close consultation with its Member States as well as industry stakeholders. It is also aligned with ICAO's Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP).

EPAS is comprised of three volumes that together outline EASA's approach to managing and improving aviation safety. Volume I sets out the strategic priorities and overall framework, Volume II details the specific actions and measures to mitigate identified risks, whilst Volume III provides an overview of the key safety issues and the broader safety risk portfolio across the aviation system.

The EPAS actions (Vol. II) assigned to the Member States are included in the State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta. Aviation stakeholders must process, document, and implement the actions where applicable to their operation.

2. State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS) in Malta

2.1 Role of the Safety Plan in Aviation Safety Management

The State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta (SPAS in Malta) is the master planning document containing the strategic direction of a State for the management of aviation safety for a set period. This plan contains the actions identified in the EPAS and also lists national safety issues with respective SPIs and SPTs to help address identified safety deficiencies and maintain/achieve an acceptable level of aviation safety. The SSP and SPAS in Malta take into consideration the appropriate actions and procedures needed to ensure that functions are appropriately addressed and executed. All documentation is updated periodically to reflect changing scenarios.

Aviation is a global business and hence requires States to work together and in a coordinated effort to ensure that safety is achieved across the different domains of the industry. In view of this, the major international and regional bodies provide various initiatives, documents and policies to help coordination at various levels.



Figure 1 - Top-down and bottom-up approach of safety-management.

The SPAS in Malta is compiled and published by Transport Malta's Civil Aviation Directorate and is reviewed annually to ensure that the safety priorities reflect the changing scenario within aviation world. These safety priorities are developed from the various data sources of TM-CAD, such as the occurrence reporting system, organisation oversight and information sharing. Additionally, any new actions identified in the EPAS which are relevant to the local aviation industry are also included. Ultimately, safety management is implemented by the aviation stakeholder through its own safety management system.

2.2 Structure of the SPAS in Malta

The SPAS in Malta is structured into four main sections, and is supplemented by appendices, as detailed below.

Section 1 and **Section 2** provide a general overview of the EPAS framework, outline the role of the SPAS, and describe the approach to safety management across the different levels of the aviation industry.

Section 3 is divided into six sub-sections. **Sub-sections 3.1** and **3.2** focus on systemic issues and safety actions related to personnel competences, and cover actions referred to as Member State Tasks and as defined in the EPAS Volume II. Each task within these sub-sections is assigned a unique Malta SPAS reference number. Each action is accompanied by a brief rationale and clearly defined objectives that the State aims to achieve. These objectives are supported by deliverables, specific actions, and timelines, whilst also identifying the relevant stakeholders and their responsibilities. Given that many of these deliverables / actions are intended to be implemented over an extended period exceeding one year, a status update is included to outline the progress achieved to date.

Sub-sections 3.3 to **3.6** provide insight on the specific operational risks and domains which are deemed crucial in enhancing operational safety and promotion of safety among the various domains. The data sources are mainly from the EPAS publication and following the analysis of reports submitted via the mandatory occurrence reporting system.

Sub-section 3.7 presents actions which closely derive from the safety objectives, indicators and targets, which are tabulated in detail in **Appendix I**. This section draws on information from EPAS and data collected from occurrence reports received by TM-CAD, identifying additional operational safety risks relevant to aviation activities in Malta and pertaining to Maltese operators.

The **Appendices** section is made up of two parts. **Appendix I** provides information about the State Safety Objectives and related SPIs and SPTs. This information is also intended to be applied and adapted according to the specific operations of each organisation. **Appendix II** contains a table of all actions included in this publication for easy reference.

3. Safety Plan Actions

The actions identified in the EPAS focus on areas where they can deliver the greatest positive impact while ensuring that safety standards are not compromised as air traffic density, and the associated safety risks, continue to grow. This section presents an updated set of actions, assigned to Member States, aimed at mitigating the primary safety risks affecting the European aviation system, while also addressing other key priorities for the sector. It provides detailed descriptions of the planned actions, along with their respective timelines.

No new MSTs have been introduced in the 2026 update of the EPAS. However, a number of previously defined tasks have reached completion, reflecting the progressive implementation of the plan and the maturity of certain safety initiatives.

3.1 Systemic Safety and Resilience

Systemic issues are system-wide concerns that affect the aviation system. These issues may be related to an array of factors, including but not limited to human factors and human performance, socio-economic factors or to deficiencies in organisational processes and procedures, whether at authority or industry level. Any such problems might contribute towards unwanted incidents or accidents if disregarded or not properly managed. To counter such concerns, big data technologies and rules simplification have been newly introduced as strategic priorities within the EPAS, with the objective of enhancing overall systemic resilience.

Identifying systemic threats is an important part of the whole aviation safety chain. In most scenarios, such threats become evident by various triggering factors and play a significant role in the development of safety occurrences.

3.1.1 Risk Interdependencies

SYS.MST.042 – Assessment of safety culture at air operators

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 1.1.3 MST.0042 - Assessment of safety culture at air operators

Rationale:

A strong safety and reporting culture is an essential enabler of an effective management system. This task aims to improve the States' capacity to assess the safety culture at air operators involved in CAT operations, and complements EPAS action RES.0053 'Mapping the socio-economic impact on aviation safety'.

State Objective:

TM-CAD shall follow guidance material and other practical tools developed by EASA to assist in measuring the safety culture of air operators and include such function in the authority's oversight programme.

Deliverables		Timeline
Oversight programme for air operators includes the assessment of safety culture.		2026
Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities		
TM-CAD	Follow guidance material and other tools issued by EASA and evaluate the introduction of new processes that assist in measuring safety culture when conducting continuous oversight of air operators.	
Aviation organisations	Participate in industry discussions and cooperation with TM-CAD.	

Actions		Target Date
i	Oversight programmes include the assessment of safety culture of air operators with the support of the EASA guidance and practical tools.	2026
	MST.0042	

Status:

Safety culture aspects are continuously evaluated during the SMS oversight of an organisation, with the support of EASA tools and guidance. This assessment is further supported by data from reported events, providing insights into the strength of the reporting culture, including the organisation's response to events and its level of proactivity.

3.1.2 Safety Management

SYS.MST.002 - Promotion of SMS

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 1.2, MST.0002 - Promotion of SMS

Rationale:

Safety promotion constitutes an essential element of an organisation's SMS within the aviation sector. It contributes to the development and maintenance of a positive safety culture and supports safety assurance activities derived from the effective operation of safety reporting systems.

TM-CAD recognises safety promotion as a key component of SMS implementation. This is achieved through the provision of appropriate support across all phases of an organisation's activities. In addition, safety promotion and related discussions are conducted during periodic meetings organised by TM-CAD, as well as through routine oversight activities.

State Objective:

TM-CAD will continue to support all organisations under its oversight in establishing, implementing, and maintaining an effective SMS within their operational framework. It shall also promote the adoption and application of safety promotion material developed by regional and

international aviation bodies. Particular emphasis shall be placed on assisting operators through targeted actions, including the provision of harmonised and proportionate guidance on management system implementation, covering areas such as change management, risk assessment, and the use of key performance indicators. This shall be complemented by the promotion of consistent practices in integrated audits by the authority, as well as the application of a risk-based approach to audit frequency and scope.

Deliverables	Timeline
Guidance/training material/best practices.	2026

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Dissemination of safety management information, alongside the continued provision of support to industry stakeholders, whilst ensuring the continued clear and effective communication channels between the CAD and operators /organisations.
Aviation organisations	Implement SMS evaluation tools and adopt an effective safety culture.

Actions		Target Date
i	Continuously raise safety awareness among the various levels of aviation activities carried out in the State. <i>MST.0002, MST.0027</i>	2026
ii	Share information published by specialised groups such as the European Safety Promotion Network and SMICG to provide further tools for organisations and assistance to their SMS. <i>MST.0002</i>	2026
iii	Provide the necessary support and guidance to organisations or operators under its oversight, especially with regards to the implementation of an effective management system, including management of changes, risk assessments, establishment of KPIs. and management of sub-contracted activities. <i>MST.0002</i>	2026

Status:

Malta has always valued the importance of safety in the aviation industry and embraces new methods that enhance the overall SMS. TM-CAD will continue promoting SMS among operators/organisations under its oversight through various sharing methods and meetings.

SYS.MST.026 – SMS assessment*EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 1.2, MST.0026 - SMS assessment***Rationale:**

A safety management system (SMS) is defined as a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures. Such system is supported by a strong assurance function that monitors compliance and performance as well as change management.

TM-CAD conducts various oversight audits among its organisations as part of its monitoring programme and makes use of checklists and assessment methods in-line with EASA standards. The new EASA Management System assessment tool is also being taken into consideration.

State Objective:

TM-CAD will continue to pursue its performance-based oversight and harmonise evaluation criteria for SMS audits by means of adopting recommendations in relation to new assessment tools.

<i>Deliverables</i>	<i>Timeline</i>
Feedback on the use of the tool.	2026
Feedback on the status of SMS compliance and performance.	2026

<i>Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities</i>	
TM-CAD	Make use of SMS assessment tools in a drive to harmonise evaluation criteria.

<i>Actions</i>		<i>Target Date</i>
i	Provide feedback on the EASA Management System assessment tool. <i>MST.0026</i>	Continuous with annual reporting
ii	Provide feedback on the status of SMS compliance and performance. <i>MST.0026</i>	Continuous with annual reporting

Status:

TM-CAD provides feedback on the SMS compliance of organisations/operators under its oversight as required in the appropriate channels / annual reporting and/or through standardisation visits.

SYS.MST.028 - Implementation of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 1.2, MST.0028 - Member States to establish and maintain a State Plan for Aviation Safety

Rationale:

A State Plan for Aviation Safety is the master planning document containing the strategic direction of a State for the management of aviation safety for a set period. This plan lists national safety issues, sets national aviation safety goals and targets, and presents a series of initiatives to address identified safety deficiencies and achieve the national safety goals and targets.

State Objective:

TM-CAD maintains the Malta State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS) and carries responsibility for its publishing, promotion and implementation of actions assigned to it and to other industry stakeholders.

Deliverables	Timeline
SPAS reviewed	2026

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	SPAS maintenance, development and implementation.
Aviation organisations	Analysis of the Malta SPAS and implemented in accordance with their operations.

Actions		Target Date
i	Identify SPIs and SPTs and review during each SPAS publication <i>MST.0028</i>	Continuous
ii	TM-CAD will publish the reviewed SPAS for the effective period and made publicly available. <i>MST.0028</i>	Q2 2026
iii	TM-CAD will maintain and regularly review the SPAS and taking into consider the pan-European safety risk areas identified in EPAS for the various aviation domains. <i>MST.0028</i>	Continuous
iv	TM-CAD will identify in SPAS the main safety risks affecting the national civil aviation safety system and set out the necessary actions to mitigate those risks. <i>MST.0028</i>	Continuous

Status:

The SPAS in Malta takes into consideration the top safety issues from the European safety risk portfolios. The SPAS in Malta is available to the relevant stakeholders, uploaded to the regional repository and publicly available on the TM-CAD website.

SYS.MST.043 - Improvement of data quality in occurrence reporting

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 1.2, MST.0043 – Improvement of data quality in occurrence reporting

Rationale:

The objective of the task is to help Member States and the Agency in data-driven decision-making to improve aviation safety. To this end, Member States should promote the benefits of good data quality and what information is required by the national competent authorities for the analysis of occurrence reports.

State Objective:

TM-CAD will gather data and provide feedback to aviation stakeholders on data quality matters. This can be done either through conferences, workshops or meetings with the industry and general aviation.

Deliverables	Timeline
Promote good data quality in occurrence reports through safety campaigns, leaflets, circulars	2026
Organise workshops or similar events to interact directly with the stakeholders regarding data quality in occurrence reports	2026

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	To conduct analysis of data quality matters and share relevant information with industry to improve/maintain a sound quality of data.
Aviation organisations	Ensure that sound occurrence reporting practices are understood and applied within the organisation.

Actions		Target Date
i	Promote good data quality in occurrence reports through safety campaigns, leaflets, circulars	2026
	<i>MST.0043</i>	
ii	TM-CAD will organise workshops or similar events to interact directly with the stakeholders regarding data quality in occurrence reports	2026
	<i>MST.0043</i>	

Status:

The CAD is in constant liaison with its aviation stakeholders that submit occurrence reports to the national database. There is an open communication on matters that require to be addressed to ensure that the quality of data is improved. Additionally, this is currently supported by periodical meetings with specific operators/organisations and is also pointed out during national conferences /meetings during which safety data is presented.

3.1.3 Human Factors and Human Performance

As new technologies and/or operating concepts emerge, including the continuous evolving complexity of systems, it is of key importance to properly assess human factors and human performance. This assessment must encompass both its limitations and contribution towards safety, as part of the implementation of safety management.

SYS.MST.034 – Oversight capabilities/focus area: flight time specification schemes

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 1.3.2 MST.0034 - Oversight capabilities/focus area: flight time specification schemes

Rationale:

It is essential for TM-CAD to have the necessary competences to approve and oversee operators' flight time specification schemes, particularly those that incorporate fatigue risk management. Emphasis should be placed on verifying the effective implementation of processes designed to meet operators' responsibilities and to ensure proper management of fatigue-related risks. Appropriate consideration of these aspects should also be monitored during audits of the operator's management system.

State Objective:

It is our objective to ensure that TM-CAD staff has the right competences to discharge their duties and keep abreast of changes that are aimed at ensuring safety operations.

<i>Deliverables</i>	<i>Timeline</i>
Report on actions implemented to foster oversight capabilities.	2026

<i>Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities</i>	
TM-CAD	Monitor the progress on standardisation in the OPS domain, specifically on the effective implementation of operators' flight time specifications schemes.
Aviation organisations	AOC holders (CAT) are to ensure that their flight time scheduling complies with applicable rules and that FTL risks are properly identified, assessed and managed within their SMS.

Actions		Target Date
i	Monitor the effective implementation of operators' flight time specification schemes during routine oversight.	2026
	MST.0034	

Status:

TM-CAD continues to track progress, particularly in the Ops domain, of operators' FTL schemes to ensure effective implementation and standardisation. In 2025, a Regulatory Instrument was also issued to harmonise requirements for operations not covered by ORO.FTL implementing rules.

SYS.MST.037 – Foster a common understanding and oversight of human factors

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 1.3.1, MST.0037 - Foster a common understanding and oversight of human factors

Rationale:

This task includes several preparatory activities to be carried out by EASA, including the development of guidance and tools for assessing the competence of regulatory staff before and after training, guidance on the appropriate level of human factors competence for trainers, and the creation of promotional material to support Member States and encourage implementation. These guidance materials and tools will assist TM-CAD in the implementation of a competence framework, as well as the planning and delivery of training for relevant regulatory staff. In addition, common guidance will encourage a harmonised understanding and oversight of human factors, while supporting the effective organisation and implementation of the competency framework and associated training programmes.

State Objective:

The objective of TM-CAD is to maintain a competent workforce to ensure its oversight and analysis function remain effective especially with regards to human factors and human performance.

Deliverables	Timeline
Produce guidance for assessing the competence of regulatory staff, and guidance for assessing the competence of trainers.	2026

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Organise the implementation of the competency framework, and plan and conduct the training for its respective regulatory staff.

Actions		Target Date
i	Development of guidance and tools for the assessment of competence of regulatory staff.	2026
	MST.0037	
ii	Development of guidance for the appropriate level of human factors competence for human factors trainers.	2026
	MST.0037	

Status:

Human factors knowledge is part of the competencies that staff engaged by TM-CAD should possess. In absence of such, the appropriate training is provided to assist them in their duties. Recurrent training is also part of each inspecting staff development programme.

3.2 Competence of Personnel

The availability of well-trained and skilled aviation personnel is fundamental to maintaining the safety and resilience of the aviation industry, making competence of personnel a key strategic priority. A skilled workforce supports effective decision-making, adherence to regulatory requirements, and the consistent application of industry best practices.

SYS.MST.033 – Sharing of best practices for language proficiency requirements

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 2.1.2, MST.0033 - Language proficiency requirements — share best practices to identify areas for improvement for the uniform & harmonised language proficiency implementation

Rationale:

The decision to address language proficiency requirements (LPRs) for pilots and air traffic controllers was first made by the 32nd Session of the ICAO Assembly in which the lack of proficiency in English was identified as a contributing factor to fatal accidents. The intent is to improve the level of language proficiency in aviation worldwide and reduce the communication breakdowns caused by a lack of language skills.

State Objective:

To provide feedback to EASA on how LPRI is implemented, including the uptake by ATOs to deliver training in English, for the purpose of harmonisation and uniform implementation.

Deliverables	Timeline
Provide feedback to EASA on the implementation status.	2026

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Ensure that feedback is recorded and provided to EASA as appropriate.
Aviation organisations	Provide feedback to TM-CAD on training programmes and related implementation.

Actions		Target Date
i	Ensure that feedback channels are in place and that the related outcome is shared with EASA when requested.	Continuous
	<i>MST.0033</i>	

Status:

TM-CAD ensures that procedures are in place for the continuous monitoring of language proficiency to maintain an adequate level of clear and effective communication, supported by published guidance documentation.

3.3 Flight Operations - Aeroplanes

The operational domain CAT and NCC by aeroplane continue to be the focus of EASA's safety activities. This sub-section provides insight on actions in the area of CAT by aeroplane (airlines and air taxi, passengers/cargo, aeroplanes of all mass categories), non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (NCC), as well as specialised operations (SPO) covering aeroplanes of all mass categories.

According to EASA's 2025 Annual Safety Report, the higher-risk Key Risk Areas (KRAs) for CAT (with complex aeroplanes) and NCC operations, based on aggregated ERCS scores, were aircraft upset, airborne collision, and runway collision. In addition to aircraft upset, Malta's 2025 occurrence data highlights other injuries and security as other top KRAs, with a notable rise in reports of GPS interference contributing to the latter.

OPS.MST.003 – Maintain regular dialogue with aircraft operators on FDM programmes

EPAS 2026 Volume II, Chapter 1.2, MST.0003 - Member States should maintain a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) programmes)

Rationale:

Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) provides an effective means of improving safety within the aviation industry. Through the routine collection and analysis of aircraft flight recorder data, it plays an essential role in an organisation's safety management system. Advances in the capture and evaluation of data parameters have further strengthened the capabilities and value of FDM programmes.

Beyond regulatory requirements, TM-CAD recognises the significance of these programmes and actively promotes their use as a supplementary tool to support both safety management and overall operational efficiency within organisations.

State Objective:

TM-CAD strives to promote the use and analysis of such programmes, together with encouraging the use of good practice documents. Additionally, TM-CAD will share relevant information to increase awareness about the European operators FDM forum (EOFDM).

Deliverables	Timeline
Encourage operators to make use of guidance / good practice documents produced by EOFDM and similar safety initiatives.	2026

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Promote the importance of FDM programmes via appropriate forums and/or conferences.
Aviation organisations	AOC holders (CAT): Participate in FDM-related events organised by TM-CAD. Analyse operational demands and pursue paths allowing for FDM analysis.

Actions		Target Date
i	Encourage operators to make use of guidance / good practice documents produced by EOFDM and similar safety initiatives, through promotion and by means of TM-CAD safety newsletter.	2026
	MST.0003	
ii	Publish relevant documentation on TM-CAD website.	2026
	MST.0003	

Status:

TM-CAD has promoted the importance of FDM programmes through dedicated workshops and safety promotion activities. This is further complemented by routine oversight of FDM programmes as part of the overall monitoring of management systems.

OPS.MST.019 – Better understanding of operators' governance structure

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 3.1.1, MST.0019 - Better understanding of operators' governance structure

Rationale:

Group operations have long been an established business model within the aviation sector, as the current regulatory framework does not prevent their implementation. In this context, MSs are encouraged to foster a thorough understanding of operators' governance structures,

particularly in relation to group operations. This includes considering factors such as the extensive use of outsourcing, the influence of financial stakeholders, and the role of management personnel, especially where such individuals fall outside the scope of approval.

Member States are also encouraged to implement the guidance published by EASA to strengthen a harmonised and effective approach to the oversight and implementation of group operations.

State Objective:

Identify the various business models and the related risks to their operation.

Deliverables	Timeline
Implementation of EASA guidance to strengthen the standardised approach to the implementation of group operations.	2026

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Implementation of guidance and oversight.
Aviation organisations	AOC holders (CAT): Risk management, SMS and Compliance monitoring functions.

Actions		Target Date
i	Implement guidance material related to group operations	2026
	MST.0019	

OPS.MST.024 – ‘Due regard’ for the safety of civil traffic

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 1.4, MST.0024 – ‘Due regard’ for the safety of civil traffic over high seas

Rationale:

There are two major airspace users in the world today - civil and military, with both sectors being essential to global stability and economies. However, both usually cannot operate simultaneously within the same block of airspace, thus requiring the establishment of boundaries and segregation to safeguard both civil and military aviation airspace activity.

Several EU Member States have reported an increase in losses of separation involving civil and military aircraft including an increase in non-cooperative military traffic over the high seas. Due to the possible hazard to civil aviation safety, the EC mandated EASA to perform a technical analysis of the reported occurrences.

State Objective:

Organisations under TM-CAD oversight shall assess the relevance of the safety issues listed in this safety risk portfolio to their own operations and, where appropriate, capture them in their management systems so that any associated risks can be mitigated effectively.

Deliverables	Timeline
Report to EASA on related incidents and actions taken.	Continuous
Coordinate to develop, harmonise and publish operational requirements and instructions for State aircraft to ensure that 'due regard' for civil aircraft is always maintained.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Report relevant events to EASA and monitor developments including evaluating and endorsing any recommendations issued by regional or international bodies.
Aviation organisations	Report to TM-CAD any encounters with military operated aircraft.

Actions		Target Date
i	Report relevant occurrences to EASA. <i>MST.0024</i>	Continuous
ii.	Coordinate with other state entities to develop operational requirements for State aircraft to ensure that 'due regard' for civil aircraft is always maintained. <i>MST.0024</i>	Continuous

Status:

TM-CAD ensures that any relevant events are reported to EASA. Furthermore, it closely monitors developments related to areas affected by conflict zones, military activity, and broader geopolitical dynamics that may impact civil aviation operations.

3.4 Rotorcraft

At a regional level, the aim of EASA's Rotorcraft Safety Roadmap is to significantly reduce the number of rotorcraft accidents and incidents across all types of operations. The strategy adopts a comprehensive approach, addressing both safety and cross-cutting issues influenced by areas such as training, operations, initial and continuing airworthiness, as well as environmental

considerations and innovation. To date, in Malta, no major events have been recorded in connection with helicopter operations.

This area includes three types of operations involving certified helicopters:

- Commercial Air Transport (CAT) operations, passenger and cargo conducted by EASA Member States' AOC holders, including passenger and cargo flights to and from offshore oil and gas installations in CAT;
- Specialised Operations (SPO), such as advertisement, photography, with an EASA Member State as the State of operator or State of registry; and
- Non-Commercial Operations (NCO) with helicopters registered in an EASA Member State or for which an EASA Member State is the State of operator (this section includes in particular training flights).

The top three identified key risk areas at European level for all types of rotorcraft operation remain unchanged from last year, and are terrain collision, aircraft upset and airborne collision.

In view of the above, the related KRA's must be risk assessed by the respective helicopter operator and ensure measures are in place to help reduce such threats.

ROT.MST.015 – Helicopter Safety events

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 4.1, MST.0015 - Helicopter Safety events.

Rationale:

CAs, in partnership with industry representatives, are encouraged to organise helicopter safety events annually or every two years. The ESPN-R, VAST, NCA, Heli Offshore or other sources of safety promotion material could be freely used and promoted.

State Objective:

It is TM-CAD's objective to ensure a high level of safety among rotorcraft users, even if the rotorcraft activity is much less than fixed-wing operations.

Deliverables	Timeline
Organise safety events.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Coordinate with industry representatives to organise helicopter safety events/disseminate promotional material to increase safety awareness within this domain.
Aviation organisations	Promote safety awareness among its operational levels.

Actions		Target Date
i	To coordinate helicopter safety events and/or promotional material	Continuous
	MST.0015	

ROT.MST.041 – Harmonisation in Helicopter AOC approvals, procedures and documents

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 4.2, MST.0041 - Harmonisation in Helicopter AOC approvals, procedures, and documents

Rationale:

Member States should harmonise and, to the extent possible, simplify the application processes in the area of commercial operations with helicopters, including the use of common application forms and compliance lists.

State Objective:

TM-CAD will follow, participate and support the development of this task together with the Helicopter Expert Group, a Subgroup of the Air OPS TEB.

Deliverables	Timeline
Simplification of processes, including the use of common application forms etc. based on the input of the Helicopter Expert Group	2027
Harmonisation of process for the issue / change of AOC (with interface to CAMOs and ATOs) considering input from the Helicopter Expert Group	2028
Harmonisation of process to add /remove aircraft to/from AOC, considering input from the Helicopter Expert Group	2028
Harmonisation of process for the implementation of EFB provisions, considering input from the Helicopter Expert Group	2027
Harmonisation of the process of approval / removal of an item to / from the MEL, including through a common application form, considering input from the Helicopter Expert Group	2027

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Harmonisation and simplification of: - the application processes in CAT helicopters, - the use of common application forms and compliance lists
Aviation organisations	Participate in industry discussions and standardise internal processes.

Actions		Target Date
i	Follow, participate and support the development of this task together with the Helicopter Expert Group.	2027 / 2028
	MST.0041	

3.5 General Aviation

General Aviation (GA) has long served as a hub for innovation, a pathway for developing young professionals, and a means of connecting communities across Europe, making the proportionate and effective management of safety risks a strategic priority.

Data for non-commercially operated small aeroplanes (MTOM below 5,700 kg) highlights the top three key risk areas as aircraft upset, terrain collision and airborne collision, followed by runway excursion.

TM-CAD continues to proactively strengthen its efforts to educate the general aviation community through targeted information sharing and awareness campaigns. These initiatives focus on promoting key safety concerns and fostering a stronger safety culture across the sector.

GA.MST.025 – Dissemination of safety messages

EPAS 2026: Volume II, Chapter 5.1.1, MST.0025 - Improvement in the dissemination of safety messages.

Rationale:

Sharing of safety information is a key element to increase awareness of threats and help identify safety issues and related mitigation measures.

State Objective:

It is TM-CAD's objective to ensure a safe environment for all GA users, especially since Malta has a particular scenario whereby all GA activities on the island depart and land at an international airport.

Deliverables	Timeline
Safety-related workshops or forums.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Promote safety information.

Aviation organisations	Ensure a proactive approach on providing, creating, and disseminating information to respective users.
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Actions		Target Date
i	Share and appropriately disseminate information among the GA community, including by means of safety workshops and safety days/evenings MST.0025	Continuous

GA.MST.027 – Safety culture in GA

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 5.1.1, MST.0027 - Promotion of safety culture in GA.

Rationale:

TM-CAD promotes a culture in which it aims, in particular, to ensure confidence of aviation professionals in occurrence reporting systems and encourages them to report any relevant safety information with a view to contribute to the enhancement of aviation safety and accident prevention. To this end, TM-CAD requires organisations to adopt just culture principles in their procedures and Safety Management.

Nevertheless, just culture must not be used to exonerate individuals from their responsibilities but rather to find a balance between full impunity and blame culture. However, TM-CAD and legislation provide exceptions to the principle of just culture. Exceptions are granted in cases of wilful misconduct, and situations where there has been a manifest, severe and serious disregard of an obvious risk and profound failure of professional responsibility to take such care as is evidently required in the circumstances, causing foreseeable damage to a person or property, or which seriously compromises the level of aviation safety.

State Objective:

The State's objective to ensure that all GA users, and all aviation professionals, are aware of a strong just culture within the Maltese aviation environment and hence occurrence reporting is encouraged as a means to improve safety within the industry.

Deliverables	Timeline
Provisions to facilitate and promote safety culture as part of SSP/SPAS.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Provide support and guidance on implementing an effective safety culture, whilst ensuring that this is also being implemented in organisations under its oversight.

Aviation organisations	Embrace a safety culture, including just culture and encouraging occurrence reporting within their management systems.
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Action		Target Date
i	Provisions to facilitate and promote safety culture as part of SSP/SPAS, through promotion by TM-CAD and by sharing guidance issued by EASA and other regulatory bodies. <i>MST.0027</i>	Continuous
ii	Provide the necessary support to encourage occurrence reporting. <i>MST.0027</i>	Continuous

GA.MST.038 – Airspace complexity and traffic congestion

EPAS 2026, Volume II, Chapter 5.1.1, MST.0038 - Airspace complexity and traffic congestion

State Objective:

To consider 'airspace complexity' and 'traffic congestion' as safety-relevant factors in airspace changes affecting uncontrolled traffic, including the changes along international borders.

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Feedback on implementation	2026

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor and promote the importance of Airspace infringement, Deconfliction of IFR and VFR traffic, Airborne separation
Aviation organisations	Ensure that all Pilots, aircraft operators, NCAs, ANSPs report, monitor and mitigate events of Airspace infringement, Deconfliction of IFR and VFR traffic, Airborne separation

Action		Target Date
i	Provide feedback on implementation and any best practices adopted for these safety-relevant factors <i>MST.0038</i>	2026

ii	Provide the necessary support to encourage occurrence reporting.	Continuous
	<i>MST.0038</i>	

3.6 Other Operational Domains

No MSTs are assigned under EPAS to the operational domains that follow. However, Member States are expected to remain informed of relevant safety developments and, where applicable, support implementation through their national oversight activities and engagement with EASA-led safety initiatives.

3.6.1 Maintenance and Continuing Airworthiness Management

Maintenance and continuing airworthiness management require a robust, risk-based approach to ensure ongoing aircraft safety and reliability. This includes strong organisational oversight, as well as clear accountability across maintenance and contracted activities, including effective management of personnel competency and human factors. A data-driven approach, making use of reliability monitoring and occurrence reporting, supports the early identification of recurring technical or systemic issues.

3.6.2 ATM/ANS

The new regulatory framework for ATM/ANS equipment is intended to ensure full compatibility with airborne and space-based systems by applying performance requirements proportionate to the nature and risk of the activity. It is also expected to deliver efficiencies for manufacturers, air navigation service providers, and competent authorities through greater harmonisation, economies of scale, increased commonality, and improved interoperability.

Improvements are monitored through the continued assessment of key risk areas and underlying safety issues within the ATM/ANS Safety Risk Portfolio, with KRAs of airborne collision and collision on runway remaining unchanged.

3.6.3 Aerodromes and Ground Handling

EPAS details actions in this area that focus on ensuring a high and uniform level of safety in aerodrome operations, taking into account the complexity of aerodrome activities and associated risks. They support international interoperability by aligning aerodrome design and operational requirements with ICAO Annex 14, ensuring that global standards are consistently transposed and applied, particularly in environments serving international traffic. The framework also strengthens the protection of aerodrome surroundings to mitigate risks arising from external activities and developments that could affect safe operations, thereby maintaining consistent

safeguards across Member States. In parallel, it promotes harmonised approaches to the conformity assessment of safety-related aerodrome equipment, enabling consistent, mutually recognised mechanisms for compliance and supporting a coherent safety system across Europe.

The top three KRAs for aerodromes and ground handling as identified in EASA's Annual Safety Review for 2025 include fire, smoke and pressurisation, followed by aircraft upset and ground damage.

3.6.4 Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Manned VTOL-Capable Aircraft

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations in the 'open' and 'specific' categories are governed by a regulatory framework that requires further supporting actions to ensure harmonised implementation across all Member States and to enable the development of operations in the 'certified' category. These measures also support the standardisation of more complex UAS activities, including operations in urban environments, and are closely linked with broader regulatory initiatives aimed at advancing safe and scalable UAS operations.

A key element of this framework is the safe integration of UAS into airspace through a dedicated set of services and procedures designed to support secure, efficient, and high-density drone operations. This includes the implementation of a structured system enabling controlled access to airspace while maintaining safety and operational oversight. Overall, the approach seeks to establish a level playing field across Member States through an operation-centric, risk- and performance-based model that enables industry growth and innovation while ensuring a high and uniform level of safety in European airspace.

3.7 Actions related to Safety Objectives

The SPAS in Malta also includes actions derived from operational risks and closely linked to the safety objectives, SPIs and SPTs included in Appendix I. These actions have been formally defined as proactive risk controls aimed at systematically mitigating and addressing the associated hazards. These are categorised into two groups: risks identified at the international level and included in previous editions of EPAS (denoted by CAD.MST), and those particularly specific to the Maltese aviation context (identified by TM.CAD).

CAD.MST.004 – Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)

Rationale:

Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime which is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always, at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved. Prevention of loss of control is a strategic priority.

State Objective:

Reduce LOC-I risks by means of data gathering from clear occurrence reporting, efficient organisational FDM analysis and effective mitigation measures.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
M-CAD	Identify events of LOC-I and monitor for threats. Include LOC-I in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC, ATO, ANS, ADR, SPO: Operators must process LOC-I threats as part of their safety management, including but not limited to: • assessing risks in their own operations; • define the ALoS including the necessary management and response levels; • define and implement the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.MST.007 – Runway excursions (RE)

Rationale:

Runway excursions cover materialised runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties in maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing.

State Objective:

Reduce REs by continuously assessing and improving risk control measures.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor events of REs to identify threats and trends. Include RE in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC holders, ATOs, ANS, ADR, SPO: Identify and address RE threats based on operations and as part of their safety management, including but not limited to: • assessing risks in their own operations; • define the ALoS including the necessary management and response levels; • define and implement the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions. Process and implement runway safety recommendations/solutions published by regional or international groups.

CAD.MST.014 – Runway incursions (RI)Rationale:

Runway incursions (RI) refer to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection, which can potentially lead to runway collision as the most credible accident outcome.

State Objective:

Reduce RIs by continuously assessing and improving risk control measures.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor events of RIs to identify threats and trends. Include RI in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC holders, ATOs, ANS, ADR, SPO: Identify and address RI threats based on operations and as part of their safety management, including but not limited to: • assessing risks in their own operations; • define the ALoS including the necessary management and response levels; • define and implement the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions. Process and implement Runway safety recommendations/solutions published by regional or international groups.

CAD.MST.010 – Airprox / mid-air collisionRationale:

Airborne conflict refers to both actual collisions as well as near misses in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisories or airspace infringements. This key risk area has been raised by several Member States through the NoA and by some airlines, specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by aircraft without transponders in uncontrolled airspace. This is one specific safety issue that is a main priority in this key risk area.

State Objective:

Assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor events of Airprox/Mid-air Collision to identify threats and trends. Include Airprox/MAC events in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.

Aviation organisations	AOC, SPO, ATO, ANS: Organisations must process Airprox/ Mid-air Collision threats as part of their safety management by: • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions. Assess and implement effective procedures based on evidence and technology-driven assisting tools which help avoid/inform about potential conflicts.
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CAD.MST.018 – Ground safety

Rationale:

Ground-handling and apron management is an important process within the overall turnaround of an aircraft operation. The safety element at such stage of operation is crucial, especially when considering the different levels of service providers roaming around the aircraft from arrival to its departure. On a regional level, it has been noticed that the risk score and incidence for such operations warranted the inclusion as part of a stand-alone domain.

State Objective:

Assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk from ground-safety and ramp-management events.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor ground-safety events for threats and trends. Include ground-safety in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC, GH, ANS, ADR: Addressing threats to ground handling and apron management in their operations. Organisations must process these threats as part of their safety management by • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.MST.005 – Fire, smoke and pressurisationRationale:

Uncontrolled fire on board an aircraft, especially when in flight, represents one of the most severe hazards in aviation. In-flight fire can ultimately lead to loss of control, either as a result of structural or control system failure, or again as a result of crew incapacitation. Fire on the ground can take hold rapidly and lead to significant casualties if evacuation and emergency response is not swift enough. Smoke or fumes, whether they are associated with fire or not, can lead to passenger and crew incapacitation and will certainly raise concern and invite a response. Even when they do not give rise to a safety impact, they can give rise to concerns and need to be addressed.

State Objective:

Assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk from fire, smoke and pressurisation events.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor fire, smoke and pressurisation events for threats and trends. Include fire, smoke and pressurisation in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC, AIR, ATO: Addressing threats to fire, smoke and fumes in their operations. Organisations must process these threats as part of their safety management by: • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.MST.006 – Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)Rationale:

This risk area includes the controlled collision with terrain together with undershoot or overshoot of the runway during approach and landing phases. It comprises situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima among others.

State Objective:

Assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk from CFIT.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor CFIT events for threats and trends. Include CFIT in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	Addressing threats to CFIT in their operations. Organisations must process these threats as part of their safety management by • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.TM.001 – Safety risk management

Rationale:

Safety risk management encompasses the various sectors of the Maltese aviation industry under TM-CAD oversight, with the aim of defining acceptable levels of safety to ensure a secure operational environment for all users. However, each stakeholder remains accountable for the safety of their own operations. As part of their Safety Management System (SMS), every aviation organisation is required to identify operational hazards and threats, assess associated risks, determine an acceptable risk level, and implement measures to eliminate or mitigate those risks.

State Objective:

To maintain an effective safety risk management framework and comply with ICAO and EASA requirements in such domain.

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
The identification of national aviation safety risks and included within the SPAS in Malta.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Implement a safety risk framework to identify operational risks across domains and implemented in the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	Implement safety risk management frameworks relevant to their operation and organisation.

CAD.TM.002 – Fatigue

Rationale:

Fatigue is the end-effect following a particular cause or activity that affects an individual's ability to conduct the task in a normal way, potentially leading to an unsafe execution of the task at hand. Fatigue may happen in a relatively short time after some significant physical or mental activity (acute) or else it may occur gradually over several days or weeks.

State Objective:

While regulatory frameworks are aimed to help reduce fatigue related events and risks, this will still occur due to the various operational challenges and scenarios within the aviation industry. In view of this, TM-CAD will monitor organisations' fatigue risk monitoring and processes to help mitigate the risk and prevent operation under fatigue conditions.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor fatigue-related events for threats and trends. Include fatigue-related events in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	Fatigue risk management procedures, including managing crew fatigue, quality sleep, roster planning among others all in relation to its business operation. Consideration should also be taken for extended flight duty periods.

CAD.TM.003 – Laser attacks

Rationale:

Laser attacks undermine the safety and security of flight operations. They can interfere with a pilot's vision and limit the crew's ability to perform their duties. Similarly, laser attacks can cause operational problems in ATC towers. There are four primary areas of concern that can jeopardise flight safety:

- a. Distraction and startle
- b. Glare and disruption
- c. Temporary flash blindness
- d. Eye damage

State Objective:

Along the past years, this phenomenon has been constantly reported, showing increasing fluctuating trends. Mitigation and control measures are highly dependent on the origin of the laser attack. Nevertheless, CAD will monitor for effectiveness the cooperation agreements currently in place between the service providers (ATC and operators) together with the local Police Force. In addition, CAD will continue monitoring laser attacks reported in Maltese airspace and on a European level.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor Laser attack events for threats and trends. Include Laser Attacks in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	Addressing threats to Laser attack events in their operations. Organisations must process these threats as part of their safety management by: • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.TM.004 – Firework displays

Rationale:

Many fireworks related to large-scale events can dispense combustible material several hundred meters into the air. Traditionally, Malta's skies are full of colour during the summer months, mainly due to the local patron saint celebrations held in each village. Given that the Luqa aerodrome is surrounded by villages offering such pyrotechnic displays, it is essential that the letting-off of such fireworks are known to the aerodrome and airline operators.

Even though history has shown that the risk of collision with cruising aircraft is small (depending on type of operation), there is a significant threat during the take-off and landing phases of flight. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that fireworks have the potential to distract and confuse aircrews if they encounter fireworks at low altitudes, specifically on approach to landing.

State Objective:

Along the years, TM-CAD was in receipt of MORs from crew members and/or the Luqa aerodrome operator regarding firework displays. These were mostly in relation to displays not being notified beforehand or in breach of the allocated timeframe. A collaboration between the Luqa aerodrome operator, Malta Police Force and firework factory groups, is in place, which has allowed for safe control of this entertainment and low-reporting numbers. Nevertheless, TM-CAD will continue monitoring for effectiveness the cooperation agreements currently in place between the parties involved and explore any relevant improvements.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor firework display events for threats and trends. Include firework threats in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.

Aviation organisations	Addressing threats to Firework related events in their operations. Organisations must process these threats as part of their safety management by: • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.
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CAD.TM.005 – Safety promotion of unmanned aircraft systems

Rationale:

As part of the continuous changing landscape in aviation, legislation for unmanned aircraft has also been introduced at a regional level (EU) and enhanced by national legislation where appropriate. The European Commission's regulation of unmanned aircraft systems utilises a risk-based approach, which incorporates each stakeholders' personal responsibility for risk management based on their operations.

As part of TM-CAD's strategy to maintain safe operations in this changing sector, TM-CAD will use all channels available to share safety-related information to UAS users. These channels include, but are not limited to, the directorate's website, social media platforms and TV appearances.

State Objective:

The CAD's objective is to primarily reduce the risks associated with unmanned aircraft operations to ensure a safe and prosperous environment for both hobbyists and commercial operations. Promotion, support and sharing of information are all steps that help raise awareness at different levels of operation and UAS categories. Each category is considered in its own type of operation however it cannot be seen in isolation to the whole UAS spectrum.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Provide the necessary guidance material on safe use of unmanned aircraft. Promote local and regional legislative requirement for the safe operation of drones.
UAS Operators	Unmanned aircraft users shall use the appropriate platform for registration of drones (https://tmcad.idronect.com/) and seek information from the appropriate websites (such as EASA - https://www.easa.europa.eu/domains/civil-drones-rpas and TM - https://www.transport.gov.mt/aviation/drones-4444).

CAD.TM.006 – State safety risk management**Rationale:**

The successful implementation of a State Safety Programme (SSP) is essential for ensuring a coordinated and proactive approach to aviation safety at the national level. This requires the active engagement of all sectors of the aviation industry through structured consultation during regulatory development, continuous coordination, and shared responsibility for effective safety outcomes. Adequate resource allocation, together with the selection and continuous training of competent personnel within designated entities is critical to ensuring that safety-related responsibilities are effectively fulfilled.

A robust SSP also depends on strong coordination and information exchange between the TM-CAD and other stakeholders. This is supported by the establishment and continuous monitoring of safety performance through clearly defined safety indicators and targets, enabling the systematic identification, assessment, and mitigation of risks across the aviation system.

State Objective:

To ensure the effective implementation and continuous enhancement of the SSP through the coordinated engagement of all aviation stakeholders, supported by sufficient resources, qualified personnel, and the continuous monitoring of safety performance through defined indicators and targets, and in line with ICAO and EASA requirements.

<i>Deliverable(s)</i>	<i>Timeline</i>
Engage all segments of the aviation industry through consultation during regulatory development processes.	Continuous
Allocate sufficient resources and ensure that personnel within designated entities are appropriately selected and trained to fulfil their safety-related responsibilities.	Continuous

<i>Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities</i>	
TM-CAD	Establish and monitor the implementation of the State Safety Programme using clearly defined safety indicators and targets.
Other National Stakeholders	Assist in the implementation, monitoring, review and operation of the SSP in accordance with state objectives.

3.7.1 Safety Threats for Individual Domains

Each domain has its share of threats related to its operation. By identifying the necessary safety nets and measuring their effectiveness, these threats can be managed and maintained at an acceptable risk level to ensure the safest operational possibility.

Appendix I addresses each of the domains and is presented in the form of a table to address the safety objective. The data source for such objectives derives from multiple sources, including EPAS recommendations and analysis of MORs submitted to the national database.

It is the responsibility of the organisation that each of these objectives are analysed and extract a realistic set of SPIs and SPTs. Each objective must take into consideration any underlying pre-cursors, which if unaddressed, may develop into a significant incident or accident.

Organisations are to also take into consideration other operational challenges such as reduced staff at various levels of operation, skill degradation and re-training requirements, technical support and staff turnover among others. The rise in various conflict zones around the globe needs to also be taken into consideration.

A risk assessment is required from the individual domain operators/organisations to ensure that these are relevant to their type of operation and mitigated appropriately. Nevertheless, this list is non-exhaustive and may be further enhanced by the respective organisation based on the type of operation it conducts.

Appendix I – Safety Objectives, SPIs and SPTs

This Appendix provides an overview of the Safety Objectives, SPIs and SPTs at both national and operator level. Additionally, this section will provide a list of compliance performance indicators monitored by TM-CAD. Items (a) and (b) are to be addressed by TM-CAD, while item (c) is aimed at the operators/organisations based on their operational domain.

The data in this appendix is gathered from multiple sources, including occurrence reports, USOAP implementation and EASA standardisation visits and resulting into specific SPIs and SPTs.

a) Compliance performance indicators monitored by TM-CAD

The following tables present a list of compliance performance indicators monitored by TM-CAD and also the systemic and operational-level safety objectives SPIs and SPTs at national level.

Compliance Performance Indicators: TM-CAD		
Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Reaction to any shortcomings and the implementation of corrective measures for continuous improvement.	Findings raised during EASA or ICAO visits are addressed and corrected in the stipulated timeframe.	Excluding issues beyond TM-CAD's control, the CAD shall strive to complete a minimum of 90% of the findings within the agreed deadline.
Compliance of Safety Standards and procedures with ICAO standards and EU regulatory requirements.	USOAP Effective Implementation % Findings classified as being of an Immediate Safety Concern during EASA standardisation visits / Significant Safety Concern for ICAO audits.	Malta aims at increasing the Effective Implementation score progressively, following each USOAP validation mission. The effective implementation score following the CMMA 2025 stands at 76.59%. Malta has no Immediate Safety Concerns (raised by EASA during standardisation visits), or Significant Safety Concerns (raised by ICAO during audits).
Safety standards and operating models are to meet the EU regulatory requirements.	Implement new EU requirements.	Implementation is always performed by the applicable deadline for each domain.
The safety standards and procedures comply with ICAO standards and EU requirements.	Implementation level of the Malta SSP is evaluated in accordance with ICAO criteria.	SSP full implementation as provided in the ICAO GASP timeline.

b) National objectives

National: Systemic-level		
Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
To publish and maintain the <i>Malta SSP</i> and <i>SPAS in Malta</i> as key elements in identifying aviation threats and risks within a safety structure.	Key risk areas are assessed by all aviation stakeholders and considered based on their operation.	The Malta SSP and SPAS will be reviewed on an annual basis to ensure that actions and safety objectives at national and operational level are kept relevant.
To support organisations under TM-CAD oversight to implement an effective SMS compliant to regulations.	(TM-CAD) SMS oversight requirements are established in all domains. (Organisations) SMS requirements are established and understood by management.	All domains with an oversight function in the CAD will have such provisions in place pursuant to regulatory requirements. All organisations will have an active SMS in their organisation, which will be audited as part of an audit cycle by the respective CAD Unit.
To implement an organisation risk profile across all CAD domains as part of its Risk-based Oversight function.	An organisation risk profile and scoring framework is created and used to assist in planning of the oversight by the CAD inspectors	Each CAD Unit will have its own organisation profile for its oversight function. The risk profile shall have measurable parameters and scoring range to allow for a risk score outcome.

To ensure that TM-CAD has the necessary human resources to conduct its oversight responsibilities.	Man-hour plan calculation is conducted taking into consideration the current operational environment and predicted growth of the Directorate. An oversight plan is created, ensuring that all organisations follow a pre-defined audit cycle.	Each CAD inspecting unit will have a man-hour plan relevant to its duties including its oversight capability function. These are to be incorporated in the directorate's manpower plan to ensure standardisation of man-hour calculations across domains. This plan is to be prepared on an annual basis and shall be kept relevant to reflect available resources and workload. Achieve at least an 85% completion rate of the annual planned audits. The audits shall be carried out within the established timeframe also take into consideration Risk-Based Oversight.
To Identify Safety Objectives across all domains within the <i>SPAS in Malta</i> and review as required.	Safety objectives are identified and further enhanced by process-oriented and outcome-oriented SPIs and SPTs for each domain.	Annual review and development of the SPIs and SPTs based on data gathered and feedback from stakeholders.
To implement and maintain an aviation safety management framework.	Implementation of the actions published in the <i>SPAS in Malta</i>.	Each action has its own target. TM-CAD will monitor these actions through liaison between TM-CAD relevant units and the stakeholder/s. The SCU shall maintain record of such monitoring and present internally on an annual basis.

	To maintain a safe aviation operating environment when exceptional circumstance(s) disrupt aviation operations including CAD oversight functions.	Applicable processes are to be followed. Ad-hoc procedures may be introduced in order to ensure that there is an immediate reaction to the circumstance.	TM-CAD shall monitor the aviation environment and react to any extraordinary circumstances that may arise. This process shall be documented through a Safety Risk Assessment and identify appropriate mitigation measures. A review period for the identified mitigation measures shall be established to ensure their effectiveness.
	Engage all aviation stakeholders at state level through consultation and coordination for the effective implementation of the SSP.	Conduct SSP Coordination Group meetings on a periodic basis, with the following responsibilities: - monitoring the safety performance of the aviation system, whilst ensuring that the SSP remains effective; - reviewing and proposing revisions to the State Safety Policy and objectives in line with Government Policy; - discussing and co-ordinating on international matters in relation to national strategy and wider policy objectives; - contributing effectively to the development of the SPAS in Malta and its implementation.	TM-CAD will coordinate with the relevant entities to ensure that SSP Coordination Group meetings are convened in accordance with the requirements set out in SSP documentation.
	Allocate sufficient resources for SSP implementation and ensure that personnel within designated entities are appropriately selected and trained to fulfil their safety-related responsibilities.	Designate personnel for SSP-related positions for each entity. Provide initial training on SSP requirements and SMS overview to all personnel involved, and establish frequency of recurrent training as required.	Achieve 90% staffing of designated SSP roles with suitably qualified personnel and ensure at least 90% completion of required safety and SSP training for relevant staff.

National: Operational-level		
Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
To maintain a high level of aviation operational safety and ensure that accidents are not caused due to negligence in the Maltese aviation system.	Number of aviation accidents (Measuring factor: absolute number and in proportion to traffic activity) <i>NAT.ACC.1:</i> - all events classified as such and that occurred in Malta - all events classified as such and that occurred elsewhere than in Malta to Malta-registered aircraft or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese licence. <i>NAT.ACC.2</i> - all events classified as such and that occurred to Malta-registered aircraft and/or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese license.	CAT: The aim is to maintain a ‘zero’ accident rate. GA and recreational aviation: The aim is to maintain a ‘zero’ accident rate.
	Number of fatal aviation accidents (Measuring factor: absolute number and in proportion to traffic activity) <i>NAT.FAC.1:</i> - all events classified as such and that occurred in Malta - all events classified as such and that occurred elsewhere than in Malta to Malta-registered aircraft or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese licence. <i>NAT.FAC.2</i> - all events classified as such and that occurred to Malta-registered aircraft and/or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese license.	CAT: The aim is to maintain a ‘zero’ fatality rate. GA: The aim is to maintain a ‘zero’ fatality rate.

To maintain a high level of aviation operational safety.	Number of aviation serious incidents (Measuring factor – absolute number and in proportion to traffic activity) <i>NAT.SER.1:</i> - all events classified as such and that occurred in Malta - all events classified as such and that occurred elsewhere than in Malta to Malta-registered aircraft or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese licence. <i>NAT.SER.2</i> - all events classified as such and that occurred to Malta-registered aircraft and/or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese license.	CAT: The aim is to maintain a downward trend in 'serious incident' classification. Nevertheless, each event has to be taken on a case-by-case basis, since TM-CAD classifies reports on the 'Worst Possible Outcome' scenario. Monitor the GA serious incident rate and evaluate against FH or local movements.
To maintain a high level of runway safety.	Runway Excursions (RE) <i>NAT.RE.1</i>	- RE in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - CAD to monitor implementation of EAPPRE recommendations. - Acceptance of organisation's safety objectives and related SPI/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process RE threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes. - Reducing trends in RE occurrences and precursor events.

	Runway Incursions (RI) <i>NAT.RI.1</i> <i>(this includes incursions by other aircraft, vehicles or persons which are present on the runway without clearance or incorrectly.)</i>	- RI risks in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - Monitoring implementation of EAPPRI recommendations. - Acceptance of organisation's safety objectives and related SPI/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process RI threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes. - Reducing trends in RI occurrences and precursor events.
To maintain a high level of aviation operational safety.	Near misses and mid-air collisions (MAC) <i>NAT.MAC.1</i>	- MAC risks in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - Monitoring implementation of EU EAPAIRR addressing Airspace infringement. - Acceptance of organisation's safety objectives and related SPI/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process MAC threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes. - Reducing trends in MAC occurrences and precursor events on organisation and sector basis.

	Controlled Flight Into or towards Terrain (CFIT) <i>NAT.CFIT.1</i>	- CFIT risks in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - Acceptance of organisation's safety objectives and related SPI/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process CFIT threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes. - Reducing trends in CFIT occurrences and precursor events on organisation and sector basis.
	Loss of Control in Flight (LOC-I) <i>NAT.LOCI.1</i>	- LOC-I risks in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - Acceptance of organisation's safety objectives and related SPIT/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process LOC-I threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes. - Reducing trends in LOC-I occurrences and precursor events on organisation and sector basis.

To maintain a high level of aviation operational safety on the ground.	Ground Collision (G-COL) <i>NAT.GCOL.1</i>	- G-COL risks will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - Acceptance of organisation's safety objectives and related SPIT/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process G-COL threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes
To maintain a high level of ground handling operational safety.	Ground Handling Operations <i>NAT.RAMP.1</i>	- Acceptance of organisation's safety objectives and related SPI/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process ground handling operation threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes - Reducing trends in ground operations related accidents, serious incidents and occurrences on organisation and sector basis.
To maintain a high level of UAS operational safety.	Unmanned Aircraft Systems <i>NAT.UAS.1</i>	- Minimise infringements of no-fly zones/restricted areas without prior notification and mitigation measures. - Permits of use are issued based on regulatory requirements. - A comprehensive UAS database to ensure traceability and control.

c) Objectives for Operators/Organisations by domain

The following tables present a list of Safety objectives that each Operator/Organisation shall analyse and risk-assess based on their operations. These objectives shall not replace any other specific threats identified by the operator/organisation.

The tables will provide will apply for the following areas of operation:

- Aerodrome
- ATM/ANS
- Commercial Air Transport
- Ground Handling
- General Aviation
- Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
- Airworthiness and Maintenance Organisations

**Aerodrome**

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	Performance of the organisation's SMS	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To maintain a high level of runway safety	Runway Excursion	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

	Runway Incursion (vehicle, aircraft or person)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Implementation of EU EAPPRI recommendations as appropriate. - Implementation of SESAR solutions as feasible
To maintain a high level of aerodrome movement surfaces in relation to aircraft movement areas.	Aerodrome surface conditions	- Identify and assess surface deficiencies. - Support surface condition monitoring with an effective preventive maintenance programme.
To maintain a high level of safety in relation to FOD in aerodrome areas.	FOD control in manoeuvring areas and apron	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Introduce/Evaluate mitigation measures and review their effectiveness as appropriate.
To maintain a high level of safety in relation to wildlife control in the aerodrome including potential bird strikes and wildlife collisions.	Bird strikes	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Introduce/Evaluate mitigation measures and review their effectiveness as appropriate.

	To maintain a high level of safety in relation to ground operations in aerodrome movement and manoeuvring areas.	RAMP- Ground Handling	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Development of own safety objectives, SPIs, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Enhance safety promotion among ground handling service providers.
	To maintain a high level of safety in relation to approach and take-off/initial climb paths.	Fireworks	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Increased level of coordination between parties involved and enhance safety promotion.

**ATM/ANS**

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	Performance of the organisation's SMS	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To maintain a high level of runway safety	Runway Excursion	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Full implementation of EU EAPPRE recommendations as appropriately feasible.

		Runway Incursion (vehicle, aircraft or person)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Full implementation of EU EAPPRE recommendations as appropriate. - Implementation of SESAR solutions as feasible.
To maintain a high level of safety on movement areas		Ground collisions – collisions while taxiing to or from a runway in use (GCOL)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation.
To maintain a high level of airspace safety.		Near misses and mid-air collisions (MAC)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Use of operational data (ex: radar data) to support monitoring and analysis of MAC occurrences. - Full implementation of EU EAPAIRR recommendations. - Implementation of SESAR solutions as feasible. - Level of Implementation of SESAR solutions aiming to reduce the risk of mid-air collision en-route.

To maintain a high level of airspace safety.	IFR Helicopter Operations	- Implementation of low level IFR helicopter routes in controlled airspace, as feasible (Ref SESAR Solutions Catalogue).
To maintain a high level of ATM/ANS technical systems and relevant functions with minimal disruptions and effects on safety.	Air navigation services communications system malfunctions or disruptions (TECH/COM)	- Threats of failures to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation including any necessary control actions and their efficiency. - Failures are to be monitored for trends.
	Air navigation services navigation system malfunctions or disruptions (TECH/NAV)	
	Air navigation services surveillance system malfunctions or disruptions (TECH/COM)	
To ensure that ATCO operational competencies and skills are maintained.	Human performance and knowledge: Maintenance of ATCO skills	- Conduct necessary assessments and identify any threats relevant to operational disruptions. - Assess and adapt as appropriate recommendations deriving from EASA published material and/or accredited ATM/ANS bodies.

	To maintain a safe and secure system from threats arising from cyber-attacks	Cybersecurity	- Security threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Develop processes procedures related to minimising and counteracting cybersecurity threats.
	To maintain a safe and secure system from threats arising from cyber-attacks	GNSS Outage and Alterations / Surveillance Degradation	- Assess and evaluate the recommendations issued from the relevant SIB as issued by EASA and/or other relevant documentation by the CAD or other accredited entities - Assess the impact of loss or anomalies of GNSS-based timing on CNS systems.



Commercial Air Transport

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	Performance of the organisation's SMS	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Cabin Safety Events.	Cabin Safety Events Pre-cursors to consider: - Unruly passengers	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Loss of Control In-Flight events.	Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) Pre-cursors to consider: - Unstabilised approach - Incorrect aircraft configuration	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Use of FDM data to support monitoring and analysis of LOC-I events. - Ensuring all flight crews are trained in upset recognition and recovery (UPRT) procedures and CRM (as applicable).
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Mid-Air collisions and near misses events.	Airprox/ mid-air collisions (MAC) Pre-cursors to consider: - Level Bust(s) - TCAS RA	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Use of FDM data to support monitoring and analysis of MAC events. - Full implementation of EU EAPAIRR recommendations as appropriately feasible.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Controlled Flight Into Terrain events.	Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) Pre-cursors to consider: - Terrain Warning - Incorrect Altimeter settings	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Use of FDM data to support monitoring and analysis of CFIT events.

To maintain a high level of runway safety	Runway Excursion	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Full implementation of EU EAPPRE recommendations as appropriately feasible.
	Runway Incursion (vehicle, aircraft or person)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Full implementation of EU EAPPRE recommendations as appropriate. - Implementation of SESAR solutions as feasible.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Laser attack events.	Laser attacks	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Fatigue-related events.	Fatigue	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Monitor Fatigue risk management systems and how they are addressed.
	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Fire or Smoke on aircraft events.	Fire or smoke on aircraft Pre-cursors to consider: - Aircraft component failures (incl. powerplant) - Galley area electrical failures - Lithium Batteries (Thermal runaway)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
	To maintain a safe and secure system from threats arising from cyber-attacks	Cybersecurity	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation.
	To ensure safe operation around conflict zones and other countries affected by War	Operations close to Conflict Zones	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Assess CZIBs as issued by EASA and/or other relevant documentation by other accredited institutes. - Review any other related ad-hoc documentation and guidance material.

To maintain a safe and secure system from threats arising from cyber-attacks	GNSS Outage and Alterations / Surveillance Degradation	- Assess and evaluate the recommendations issued from relevant SIB as issued by EASA and/or other relevant documentation by the CAD or other accredited entities - Ensure that flight crews are aware, trained and prepared to recognise and adequately respond to an encounter of GNSS interferences during flight. - Assess operational risks and limitations linked to the loss of on-board GNSS capability, including any on-board systems requiring inputs from a reliable GNSS signal, e.g., impact on TAWS.
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Ground Handling

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	Performance of the organisation's SMS	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks due to ground operations and general ground handling activities.	Poor condition and preventive maintenance of ground handling equipment	- Threats are to be identified, and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Devise a preventive maintenance schedule. - Increase awareness among ground handling personnel about the importance of ground-handling equipment condition and monitoring.

	Adherence to Apron procedures	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Increase awareness among ground handling personnel about Apron traffic diligence.
	Ground-handling induced FOD on aircraft movement areas	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
	Collision with Aircraft / Aircraft damage	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.




General Aviation

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	Performance of the organisation's SMS	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Loss of Control In-Flight events.	Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) Pre-cursors to consider: - Unstabilised approach	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Ensuring all flight crews are trained at a proper level for upset recognition and recovery (UPRT) procedures.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Mid-Air collisions and near miss events.	Airprox/ Mid-Air collisions (MAC) Pre-cursors to consider: - Level Bust(s) - Situational awareness	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Controlled Flight Into Terrain events.	Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Pre-cursors to consider: - Incorrect Altimeter settings	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To maintain a high level of runway safety	Runway Excursion	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
	Runway Incursion (vehicle, aircraft or person)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Fire or Smoke on aircraft events.	Fire or smoke on aircraft	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

		SCF powerplant / Non-powerplant	- Threats related to ageing and high utilisation aircraft are identified and mitigated. - Monitor common failures of component serviceability and operational lifetime
	To continuously improve safety awareness among the GA community and encourage safety reporting of MORs.	Enhance the MOR reporting knowledge among users of GA	- Increase awareness among general aviation personnel about the importance of reporting MORs. - Enhance safety promotion among general aviation users.
	To ensure that safety awareness and root-cause of latent/repetitive issues are addressed in an effective manner.	Root-cause analysis following an MOR event	- Enhance the Root Cause Analysis, causal factors identification and mitigation measures for reportable events.



Rotorcraft

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	Performance of the organisation's SMS	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Loss of Control In-Flight events.	Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I) Pre-cursors to consider: - Unstabilised approach	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Ensuring all flight crews are trained at a proper level for upset recognition and recovery (UPRT) procedures.

To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Mid-Air collisions and near miss events.	Airprox/ mid-air collisions (MAC) Pre-cursors to consider: - Level Bust(s) - Situational awareness	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Controlled Flight Into Terrain events.	Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Pre-cursors to consider: - Incorrect Altimeter settings	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to collision with obstacles or surroundings.	Obstacle collision in flight	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.



Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	Performance of the organisation's SMS	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to mid-air collisions and near miss events between UAS and other UAS or manned aircraft.	Airprox/ mid-air collisions (MAC)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPT's with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to loss of control, including those due to system failures.	Loss of Control In-Flight	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPT's with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to ground collisions and impact with third party property and injuries (not involving other aircraft)	Third Party Conflict	- Identify risks and mitigations to avoid injury to people on the ground and possible damage to property. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPT's with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To ensure the safe operation of UAS according to airspace class.	Flight Authorisation Conditions	- No-Fly Zones/Restricted areas of operation are identified. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPT's with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To maintain a safe and secure system from threats arising from cyber-attacks	Cybersecurity	- Cybersecurity threats to be identified and risk assessed appropriately.
To ensure operator competence to limit incidents related to human factors and technical knowledge.	Operator Error	- Ensure that remote pilots and maintenance staff are adequately trained and licenced, and that currency is maintained. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPT's with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.



Airworthiness and Maintenance Organisations

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	Performance of the organisation's SMS	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks. - Monitor for effectiveness - Assess relevant documentation and guidance material published from regulatory bodies and/or reputable entities and review procedures accordingly.
To ensure that safety threats are identified and addressed in an effective manner.	Identification of occurrences related to the maintenance organisation's operations.	- Identify shortcomings in maintenance activities at a level that may put aviation safety at risk. - Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPT's with a reduction in trends and reviewed annually. - Promote timely reporting of occurrences in maintenance organisations. - Encourage a more systematic and proactive hazard identification process to uncover possible latent risks and hazards.

	To ensure the safe installation of correct aircraft parts during maintenance.	Identification of correct aircraft parts delivery before installation	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation.
	To ensure the safe maintenance release and related airworthiness documentation.	Airworthiness documentation management	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation.
	To ensure safe Parking / Storage / Return to service of aircraft	Contamination of the air data system/pitot static probes	- Assess SIB's issued by EASA (as revised) and adopt recommendations (ref: SIB 2020-14). - Identify effective mitigation measures.

Appendix II – List of Actions / Indicators

SPAS in Malta Reference	Description
SYS.MST.002	Promotion of SMS
SYS.MST.026	SMS assessment
SYS.MST.028	Member States to establish and maintain a SPAS
SYS.MST.033	Sharing of best practices for language proficiency requirements
SYS.MST.034	Oversight capabilities/focus area: flight time specification schemes
SYS.MST.037	Human Factors Competence for Regulator Staff
SYS.MST.042	Assessment of safety culture at air operators
SYS.MST.043	Improvement of data quality in occurrence reporting
OPS.MST.003	Member States should maintain a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on FDM programmes
OPS.MST.019	Better understanding of operators' governance structure
OPS.MST.024	'Due regard' for the safety of civil traffic
ROT.MST.015	Helicopter Safety events
ROT.MST.041	Harmonisation in Helicopter AOC approvals, procedures and documents
GA.MST.025	Improvement in the dissemination of safety messages
GA.MST.027	Promotion of safety culture in GA
GA.MST.038	Airspace complexity and traffic congestion
CAD.MST.004	Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)
CAD.MST.005	Fire, smoke and pressurisation
CAD.MST.006	Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)
CAD.MST.007	Runway excursions (RE)
CAD.MST.010	Airprox / mid-air collision
CAD.MST.014	Runway incursions (RI)
CAD.MST.018	Ground safety
CAD.TM.001	Safety risk management
CAD.TM.002	Fatigue
CAD.TM.003	Laser attacks
CAD.TM.004	Firework displays
CAD.TM.005	Safety promotion of unmanned aircraft systems
CAD.TM.006	State safety risk management
NAT.FAC.1	Number of fatal aviation accidents (CAT)
NAT.FAC.2	Number of fatal aviation accidents (GA)
NAT.SER.1	Number of aviation serious incidents (CAT)
NAT.SER.2	Number of aviation serious incidents (GA)

SPAS in Malta Reference	Description
NAT.RE.1	Runway Excursions
NAT.RI.1	Runway Incursions
NAT.MAC.1	Near misses and Mid-air collisions
NAT.CFIT.1	Controlled flight into or towards terrain
NAT.LOCI.1	Loss of control in flight
NAT.GCOL.1	Ground Collision
NAT.RAMP.1	Ground Handling operations
NAT.UAS.1	Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

