State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta

2025

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Foreword

The safety management system is a key pillar within the operational structure of the aviation industry. High safety standards instil confidence not only in the users, but also in its stakeholders: investors, employees, agencies, and authorities. Investment in robust safety systems is of utmost importance, not only as a means of continuous safe operations, but also to be re-active in unprecedented times.

As the industry continues to develop, so does our actions towards aviation safety. With new data streams and information capturing tools, stakeholders can adopt a pro-active approach and further strengthen their reactive process to operational risks. Although aviation is one of the safest modes of transport, the past years have provided strong challenges to the SMS structure due to the unprecedented challenging scenarios.

Documents such as the Malta State Plan for Aviation Safety, the European Plan for Aviation, and the Global Aviation Safety Programme all contribute towards the strengthening of an organisations' SMS. These legacy documents may also be further supported with risk-specific documents, and safety information bulletins that will supplement the safety risk portfolio. All the above provide robust guidance material for all industry stakeholders to assist them in their operating scenario assessment and ensure continuity of operations in a safe and prosperous manner.

Together as stakeholders, we must remain attentive to our operational environment and constantly identify operational risks and effectively implement and monitor mitigations as part of an effective safety management system.

SPAS in Malta Amendment Record

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Third-party documents relevant to this Issue

- European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) 2025 Edition
- European Aviation Safety Programme
- ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP)
- Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Safety Management)

Revision details

Issue No	Date	Details
01/2014	May 2014	Publication of TM-CAD State Safety Plan 2014-2017.
02/2020	December 2020	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2020-2024 to reflect MST actions published in EPAS 2020-2024. Specific actions from EPAS 2018-2022 and 2019-2023 were also included.
03/2021	November 2021	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2021-2025 to reflect MST actions published in EPAS 2021-2025, including specific actions from previous EPAS publications.
04/2022	November 2022	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2022-2026 to reflect MST actions published in EPAS 2022-2026, including specific actions from previous EPAS publications.
05/2023	July 2023	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2023-2025 to reflect MST actions published in EPAS 2023-2025, including specific actions from previous EPAS publications as applicable.
06/2024	September 2024	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2024-2025 to reflect MST actions published in EPAS 2024 Edition, including specific actions from previous EPAS publications as applicable.
07/2025	June 2025	Publication of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta 2025 to reflect MST actions published in EPAS 2025 Edition, including specific actions from previous EPAS publications as applicable.

Abbreviations

ALoS	Acceptable Level of Safety
AOC	Air Operator's Certificate
ASR	Annual Safety Report
CA	Competent Authority
CAD	Civil Aviation Directorate
CAT	Commercial Air Transport
CFIT	Controlled Flight Into Terrain
EASA	European Aviation Safety Agency
EC	European Commission
EPAS	European Plan for Aviation Safety
FDM	Flight Data Monitoring
FOD	Foreign Object Debris / Foreign Object Damage
GA	General Aviation
GCOL	Ground Collision
GH	Ground Handling
GHSP	Ground Handling Service Provider
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
KRA	Key Risk Areas
LOC-I	Loss of Control In-flight
MAC	Mid-Air Collision
MOR	Mandatory Occurrence Report
MS	Member State
NCO	Non-Commercial Operations
NoA	Network of Analysts
RE	Runway Excursion
RI	Runway Incursion
RNO	Return to Normal Operations
SMM	Safety Management Manual
SMS	Safety Management System
SPAS	State Plan for Aviation Safety
SPAS in Malta	State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta
SPI	Safety Performance Indicator
SPO	Specialised Operations
SPT	Safety Performance Target
SSP	State Safety Programme
TM-CAD	Transport Malta Civil Aviation Directorate
UAS	Unmanned Aircraft Systems
USOAP CMA	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach

1. European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS)

The European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) is the instrument to prioritise and manage actions to maintain and further improve aviation safety and environmental protection, while ensuring efficiency, proportionality and level playing field.

EPAS is the aviation safety action plan derived from the main safety risks identified at European level and a key element of the European aviation safety strategy. EPAS is built on a proactive approach to support the future growth of aviation while securing a high and uniform level of safety for all Member States (MSs). This proactive approach allows the European Commission (EC), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and MSs to take the necessary actions at the right time in order to prioritise the risks to be managed and to face the challenges posed by the increasing complexity and continued growth in civil aviation, as well as to ensure safe, secure and environmentally friendly implementation of new business models and new technologies.

The overall safety objective is to maintain and whenever feasible to further improve the present safety performance level of the European aviation system in the face of upcoming changes. The EPAS reference period has now been reduced to a three-year timeframe to allow for a more targeted and focused approach. Furthermore, the EPAS continues to be reviewed and improved through annual updates. The plan is an integral part of EASA's work programme and is developed by EASA, in close consultation with the EASA MSs and industry. It is consistent with the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP). A copy of the EPAS can be downloaded from the EASA website under the Safety Management & Promotion page.

The EPAS actions assigned to the Member States are included in the State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta. Aviation stakeholders must process, document, and implement the actions where applicable to their operation.

Figure 1 - Flow of EPAS Strategic Priorities
Adapted from (EASA, 2020)

2. State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta

2.1 Role of the Safety Plan in aviation safety management

The State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta (SPAS in Malta) is the master planning document containing the strategic direction of a State for the management of aviation safety for a set period. This plan contains the actions identified in the EPAS and also lists national safety issues with respective SPIs and SPTs to help address identified safety deficiencies and maintain/achieve an acceptable level of aviation safety. The SSP and SPAS in Malta take into consideration the appropriate actions and procedures needed to ensure that functions are appropriately addressed and executed. All documentations are considered as 'live-documents' and are updated periodically to reflect changing scenarios.

Aviation is a global business and hence requires States to work together and in a coordinated effort to ensure that safety is achieved across the different domains of the industry. In view of this, the major international and regional bodies provide various initiatives, documents and policies to help coordination at various levels.

Figure 2 - Top-down and bottom-up approach of safety-management.

The SPAS in Malta is compiled and published by Transport Malta's Civil Aviation Directorate and is reviewed annually to ensure that the safety priorities reflect the changing scenario within aviation world. These safety priorities are developed from the various data sources of TM-CAD, such as the occurrence reporting system, organisation oversight and information sharing. Additionally, any new actions identified in the EPAS which are relevant to the aviation scenario of Malta will also be updated. Ultimately, safety management is implemented by the aviation stakeholder through their own safety management system.

2.2 Structure of the SPAS in Malta

The SPAS in Malta is divided into four sections including appendices, whereby each section is addressing specific matters of information. The two noteworthy action areas can be found in Section 3 and in the relevant Appendices.

Section 1 and **Section 2** provide a general overview of the EPAS framework, the role of the SPAS and the approach adopted towards safety management by the various levels of the aviation industry.

Section 3 is divided into four sub-sections. **Sub-section 3.1 and 3.2** deal with the Systemic issues and safety actions related to Personnel Competence, mostly as identified in Volume II of the EPAS and address the actions referenced as 'MST'. Each task identified in these two sub-sections has been identified with a unique SPAS in Malta reference number. A correlation list for these references can be found in **Appendix II.**

Each action includes a brief rationale and the objective the State would like to achieve. The objective is supported with deliverables, specific actions and a timeline. The effective stakeholder's and responsibilities are also identified in these sections.

Sub-section 3.3 provides insight on the specific operational risks which are deemed crucial in enhancing operational safety and promotion of safety among the various domains. The data sources are mainly from the EPAS publications and following the analysis of reports submitted via the mandatory occurrence reporting system.

Sub-section 3.4 presents the individual domain data which is tabulated in **Appendix I**. This section is based on the information presented in the EPAS and data gathered from occurrence reports received by TM-CAD and assessed as additional safety operational risks in relation to Maltese aviation activity.

The **Appendices** section is made up of two parts. **Appendix I** provides information about the State Safety Objectives and related SPIs and SPTs. Information effective for each aviation domain is addressed in these appendices and are be processed in relation to the organisation's operation and adapted as required. **Appendix II** tabulates all actions in this publication.

3. Safety Plan Actions

The actions provided in this section are linked to priorities assigned to Member States as identified in Volume II of the EPAS 2025. The actions identified in the EPAS are specific to areas where they can have the largest positive impact and ensure that safety standards are not compromised as air traffic density, and the safety risks associated with that, continue to grow.

3.1 Systemic safety & resilience

EPAS 2025, Vol II, Chapter 1

Systemic issues are system-wide problems that affect the aviation system. These problems may be related to an array of factors, including but not limited to human factors and human performance, socio-economic factors or to deficiencies in organisational processes and procedures, whether at authority or industry level. Any such problems might contribute towards unwanted incidents or accidents if disregarded or not properly managed.

Identifying systemic threats is an important part of the whole aviation safety chain. In most scenarios, such threats become evident by various triggering factors and play a significant role in the development of safety occurrences.

3.1.1 Risk interdependencies

SYS.MST.040 – Safety and security reporting coordination mechanism

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.1.2 MST.0040 - Safety and security reporting coordination mechanism.

Rationale:

The specific objective of this task is to efficiently contribute to the protection of the aviation system from information security risks, and to make it more resilient to information security events and incidents. To achieve this objective, Opinion No 03/2021 proposes the introduction of provisions for the identification and management of information security risks which could affect information and communication technology systems and data used for civil aviation purposes, detecting information security events, identifying those which are considered information security incidents, and responding to, and recovering from, those information security incidents to a level commensurate with their impact on aviation safety.

State Objective:

Without prejudice to the obligations stemming from Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, Member States shall ensure that appropriate coordination mechanisms are established between safety and security reporting systems to allow for an integrated approach to the management of risks.

Deliverables	*Timeline*
Provide feedback on implementation of MST.0040.	2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Increase safety by managing the impact of security on safety and mitigating related safety risks.
Aviation organisations	Continuous assessment and mitigation of security threats.

Actions		*Target Date*
i	Feedback on implementation of MST.0040 *MST.0040, RMT.0720*	2025

SYS.MST.042 – Assessment of safety culture at air operators

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.1.4 MST.0042 - Assessment of safety culture at air operators.

Rationale:

A strong safety and reporting culture is an essential enabler of an effective management system. This task aims to improve the States' capacity to assess the safety culture at air operators involved in CAT operations, and complements EPAS action RES.0053 'Mapping the socio-economic impact on aviation safety'.

State Objective:

TM-CAD shall follow guidance material developed by EASA to assist in measuring the safety culture of air operators and include such function in the authority's oversight programme.

Deliverables	*Timeline*
Oversight programme for air operators includes the assessment of safety culture	2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Follow guidance material issued by EASA and evaluate the introduction of new processes that assist in measuring safety culture when conducting continuous oversight of air operators.
Aviation organisations	Participate in industry discussions and cooperation with TM-CAD.

Actions		Target Date
i	Oversight programmes include the assessment of safety culture of air operators with the support of the EASA guidance and practical tools. *MST.0042*	2025

3.1.2 Safety management

SYS.MST.001 – Implementation of State Safety Programme (SSP)

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.2, MST.0001 - Member States to give priority to the work on SSPs.

Rationale:

As defined by ICAO, the State Safety Programme (SSP) is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety. The programme is part of a comprehensive management system for the administration of safety by the State. It is the responsibility of the State to create and implement an effective SSP.

State Objective:

TM-CAD strives to ensure that Regional and International aviation safety standards are observed, implement an effective SSP and maintain up-to-date safety management policies.

Deliverables	Timeline
SSP effectively implemented.	2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	SSP maintenance, development, and implementation.
Aviation organisations	Analysis of the Malta SSP and SPAS and processed in-line with their operations.

Actions		Target Date
i	TM-CAD shall work with industry stakeholders, including State authorities in order to ensure that there is effective safety management coordination. *MST.0001, MST.0028*	Continuous
ii	TM-CAD shall ensure that it effectively implements its authority requirements and address deficiencies in its oversight capabilities. *MST.0001, MST.0028*	Continuous

iii	TM-CAD shall ensure that it has the necessary resources to achieve the oversight capabilities and management elements identified in the SSP. *MST.0001, MST.0028*	Continuous
iv	TM-CAD shall ensure that inspectors have the right competencies to support the evolution towards risk- and performance-based oversight. *MST.0001, MST.0028*	Continuous
v	TM-CAD shall ensure that policies and procedures are in place for RBO and PBO. *MST.0001, MST.0028*	Continuous
vi	TM-CAD shall ensure that its policies and procedures for safety data collection, analysis, exchange, and protection are in accordance with Regulation (EU) no 376/2014. *MST.0001, MST.0028*	Continuous
vii	Ensure that a process is established to determine SPIs at State-level. *MST.0001, MST.0028*	Continuous
viii	Ensure that the Malta SSP is regularly reviewed and assessed. The document shall be made available and shared with the other Member States and EASA. *MST.0001, MST.0028*	Continuous
ix	Consider civil-military coordination aspects where relevant for State safety management activities, with a view to identifying where civil-military coordination and cooperation will need to be enhanced to meet the SSP objectives. *MST.0001, MST.0028*	Continuous

Status:

The Malta SSP has been effective in its initial implementation stages and served as a good basis for the aviation community and growth on the Island. A major revision of the SSP was published in August 2020, based on the ICAO Safety Management Manual Doc 9859 (4th Edition) and also taking into consideration information provided from other streams such as EASA publications and the ICAO GASP.

Further amendments to the SSP were made in 2022 and 2023, with TM-CAD continuously striving to improve the documentation of the Malta SSP and its effectiveness within the aviation industry to enhance the industry's overall safety management.

SYS.MST.002 - Promotion of SMS

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.2, MST.0002 - Promotion of SMS.

Rationale:

As part of a holistic SMS framework, safety promotion plays a crucial part in aviation SMS. Safety promotion helps drive a healthy safety culture and contributes towards ensuring safety assurance activities stemming from an effective safety reporting system

Safety promotion is one of the key aspects embraced by TM-CAD. This is primarily done by providing the necessary support during each phase of an organisation's operation. Additionally, promotion and discussions are conducted during periodic meetings organised by TM-CAD and during the general oversight of the organisations.

State Objective:

TM-CAD will continue supporting all organisations under its oversight in having an effective SMS as part of their framework. Additionally, TM-CAD encourages the implementation of promotional material developed by regional and/or international aviation entities about safety management. TM-CAD will, in particular, support the implementation of effective management systems for small operators through targeted actions as defined below.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Guidance/training material/best practices.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Dissemination of safety management information and continue offering support to its industry partners, while ensuring that there are clear communication paths between the CAD and the operators/organisations.
Aviation organisations	Implement SMS evaluation tools and adopt an effective safety culture.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	Continuously raise safety awareness among the various levels of aviation activities carried out in the State. *MST.0002, MST.027, SPT.0057*	Continuous
ii	Share information published by specialised groups such as SMICG to provide further tools for organisations as assistance to their SMS. *MST.0002, SPT.0057*	Continuous
iii	Provide the necessary support and guidance to organisations or operators under its oversight, especially with regards to the implementation of an effective management system, including	Continuous

	management of changes, risk assessments, establishment of KPIs. and management of sub-contracted activities. *MST.0002, SPT.0057*	

Status:

Malta has always valued the importance of safety in the aviation industry and embraces new methods that enhance the overall SMS. TM-CAD will continue promoting SMS among operators/organisations under its oversight through various sharing methods and meetings.

SYS.MST.026 – SMS assessment

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.2, MST.0026 - SMS assessment.

Rationale:

A safety management system (SMS) is defined as a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures. Such system is supported by a strong assurance function that monitors compliance and performance as well as change management.

TM-CAD conducts various oversight audits among its organisations as part of its monitoring programme and makes use of checklists and assessment methods in-line with EASA standards. The new EASA Management System assessment tool is also being taken into consideration.

State Objective:

TM-CAD will continue to pursue its performance-based oversight and harmonise evaluation criteria for SMS audits by means of adopting recommendations in relation to new assessment tools.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Feedback on the use of the tool.	Continuous
Feedback on the status of SMS compliance and performance.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Make use of SMS assessment tools in a drive to harmonise evaluation criteria.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	Provide feedback on the EASA Management System assessment tool. *MST.0026*	Continuous with annual reporting (October)

ii	Provide feedback on the status of SMS compliance and performance. *MST.0026*	Continuous with annual reporting (October)

Status:

TM-CAD provides feedback on the SMS compliance of organisations/operators under its oversight as required in the appropriate channels / annual reportingand/or through standardisation visits.

SYS.MST.028 - Implementation of State Plan for Aviation Safety in Malta

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.2 MST.0028 - Member States to establish and maintain a State Plan for Aviation Safety.

Rationale:

A State Plan for Aviation Safety is the master planning document containing the strategic direction of a State for the management of aviation safety for a set period. This plan lists national safety issues, sets national aviation safety goals and targets, and presents a series of initiatives to address identified safety deficiencies and achieve the national safety goals and targets.

State Objective:

TM-CAD maintains the Malta State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS) and carries responsibility for its publishing, promotion and implementation of actions assigned to it and to other industry stakeholders.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
SPAS reviewed	Q2 2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	SPAS maintenance, development and implementation.
Aviation organisations	Analysis of the Malta SPAS and implemented in accordance with their operations.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	Identify SPIs and SPTs and review during each SPAS publication *MST.001, MST.0028*	Continuous

ii	TM-CAD will publish the reviewed SPAS for the effective period and made publicly available. *MST.0028*	Q2 of each subsequent year
i	TM-CAD will maintain and regularly review the SPAS and taking into consider the pan-European safety risk areas identified in EPAS for the various aviation domains. *MST.0028*	Continuous
ii	TM-CAD will identify in SPAS the main safety risks affecting the national civil aviation safety system and set out the necessary actions to mitigate those risks. *MST.0028*	Continuous

Status:

The SPAS in Malta takes into consideration the top safety issues from the European safety risk portfolios. The SPAS in Malta is available to the relevant stakeholders, uploaded to the regional repository and publicly available on the TM-CAD website.

SYS.MST.043 - Improvement of data quality in occurrence reporting

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.2, MST.0028 - Member States to establish and maintain a State Plan for Aviation Safety.

Rationale:

The objective of the task is to help Member States and the Agency in data-driven decision-making to improve aviation safety. To this end, Member States should promote the benefits of good data quality and what information is required by the national competent authorities for the analysis of occurrence reports.

State Objective:

TM-CAD will gather data and provide feedback to aviation stakeholders on data quality matters. This can be done either through conferences, workshops or meetings with the industry and general aviation.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Promote good data quality in occurrence reports through safety campaigns, leaflets, circulars	2026
Organise workshops or similar events to interact directly with the stakeholders regarding data quality in occurrence reports	2026

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	To conduct analysis of data quality matters and share relevant information with industry to improve/maintain a sound quality of data.
Aviation organisations	Ensure that sound occurrence reporting practices are understood and applied within the organisation.

Actions		*Target Date*
i	Promote good data quality in occurrence reports through safety campaigns, leaflets, circulars	2026
	MST.0043	
ii	Organise meetings with aviation stakeholders in relation to occurrence reporting quality matters.	2026
	MST.0043	

Status:

The CAD is in constant liaison with its aviation stakeholders that submit occurrence reports to the national database. There is an open communication on matters that require to be addressed to ensure that the quality of data is improved. Additionally, this is currently supported by periodical meetings with specific operators/organisations and is also pointed out during national conferences /meetings during which safety data is presented.

3.1.3 Human factors and human performance

As new technologies and/or operating concepts emerge, including the continuous evolving complexity of systems, it is of key importance to properly assess human factors and human performance. This assessment must encompass both its limitations and contribution towards safety, as part of the implementation of safety management.

SYS.MST.034 – Oversight capabilities/focus area: flight time specification schemes

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.3.2 MST.0034 - Oversight capabilities/focus area: flight time specification schemes.

Rationale:

It is important that TM-CAD possesses the required competence to approve and oversee the operators' flight time specification schemes; in particular, those including fatigue risk management. TM-CAD should focus on the verification of effective implementation of processes established to meet operators' responsibilities requirements and to ensure an adequate management of fatigue risks. Due consideration should be given to the latter when performing audits of the operator's management system.

State Objective:

It is our objective to ensure that TM-CAD staff has the right competences to discharge their duties and keep abreast of changes that are aimed at ensuring safety operations.

Deliverables	*Timeline*
Report on actions implemented to foster oversight capabilities.	2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor the progress on standardisation in the OPS domain, specifically on the effective implementation of operators' flight time specifications schemes.
Aviation organisations	AOC holders (CAT) to ensure that their flight time scheduling reflects discussions and implemented rules.

Actions		*Target Date*
i	Monitor the effective implementation of operators' flight time specification schemes during routine oversight. *MST.0034*	2025

SYS.MST.037 – Foster a common understanding and oversight of human factors

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.3.1, MST.0037 - Foster a common understanding and oversight of Human Factors.

Rationale:

Common guidance material aimed at competent authorities will contribute towards a common understanding and oversight of Human Factors. This guidance material will assist in the organisation and implementation of the competency framework, planning and execution of the training for the respective regulatory staff.

State Objective:

The objective of TM-CAD is to maintain a competent workforce to ensure its oversight and analysis function remain effective especially with regards to human factors and human performance.

Deliverables	*Timeline*
Produce guidance for assessing the competence of regulatory staff, and guidance for assessing the competence of trainers.	2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Organise the implementation of the competency framework, and plan and conduct the training for its respective regulatory staff.

Actions		*Target Date*
i	Development of guidance and tools for the assessment of competence of regulatory staff. *MST.0037, SPT.0115*	2025
ii	Development of guidance for the appropriate level of human factors competence for human factors trainers. *MST.0037, SPT.0115*	2025

Status:

Human factors knowledge is part of the competencies that staff engaged by TM-CAD should possess. In absence of such, the appropriate training is provided to assist them in their duties. Recurrent training is also part of each inspecting staff development programme.

The CAD will evaluate any guidance material and tools provided in order to streamline competency in human factors oversight.

SYS.MST.032 – Oversight and Standardisation

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.4, MST.0032 - Oversight capabilities/focus areas.

Rationale:

The capability and ability to conduct oversight and standardisation is a critical element of any competent authority, and EASA as the regional oversight agency. It is therefore necessary that for CAD, as the competent authority to have the necessary resources to allow it to perform its oversight function in a safe and effective way. The aim is to achieve an effective risk-based and compliance-based oversight to address operational and safety-related issues.

State Objective:

The objective of TM-CAD is to maintain an effective level of oversight and continuous ability to conduct its responsibilities within a robust EASA oversight system. Such objective can be achieved with particular focus on:

- adequate personnel employed/contracted with TM-CAD;
- cooperative oversight in all sectors (as required)
- organisation's management system in all sectors

Deliverables	*Timeline*
Effective plan and allocation of tasks to ensure the adequate availability of personnel.	Continuous
Where necessary, cooperation agreements with other competent authorities are in place to ensure sufficient and effective oversight.	Continuous
Ability of TM-CAD to assess and oversee the organisations' management system in all sectors.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Create procedures and measurement tools to ensure that its oversight functions can be conducted in an effective manner.

Actions		*Target Date*
i	Member States to ensure that adequate personnel are available to discharge their safety oversight responsibilities. *MST.0032*	Continuous
ii	Assessment, monitoring and improvement of knowledge and capabilities of TM-CAD workforce in a modern aviation environment. *MST.0032*	Continuous
iii	Provisions are in place for cooperative oversight in all sectors. Ensure that each organisation's activities are duly assessed and adequately overseen. *MST.0032*	Continuous
iv	Oversight activities for organisations under TM-CAD's oversight and monitoring and analysis of organisational safety performance. *MST.0032*	Continuous

Status:

TM-CAD has procedures in place to ensure that the oversight programme is planned as stipulated by regulation and conducted rigorously to a high standard. The CAD is continuously investing in personnel and oversight tools as one of the means to maintain an effective and standardised oversight function across different domains.

3.2 Competence of personnel

SYS.MST.033 – Sharing of best practices for language proficiency requirements

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 2.1.2, MST.0033 - Language proficiency requirements — share best practices to identify areas for improvement for the uniform & harmonised language proficiency implementation

Rationale:

The decision to address language proficiency requirements (LPRs) for pilots and air traffic controllers was first made by the 32nd Session of the ICAO Assembly in which the lack of proficiency in English was identified as a contributing factor to fatal accidents. The intent is to improve the level of language proficiency in aviation worldwide and reduce the communication breakdowns caused by a lack of language skills.

State Objective:

To provide feedback to EASA on how LPRI is implemented, including the uptake by ATOs to deliver training in English, for the purpose of harmonisation and uniform implementation.

Deliverables	*Timeline*
Provide feedback to EASA on how the LPRI is implemented.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Ensure that feedback is recorded and provided to EASA as appropriate.
Aviation organisations	Provide feedback to TM-CAD on training programmes and related implementation.

Actions		*Target Date*
i	Ensure that feedback channels are in place and that the related outcome is shared with EASA when requested. *MST.0033*	Continuous
ii	TM-CAD to ensure that examination procedures are effective and part of its internal oversight function.	Continuous

Status:

TM-CAD utilises ICAO Doc 9835 and FCL.055 as its basis for guidelines in relation to the implementation of Language Proficiency Requirements. Nevertheless, procedures are in place for continuous monitoring of such language proficiency and to ensure that an adequate level of clear communication is obtained.

SYS.MST.036 – PPL/LAPL learning objectives

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 2.2, MST.0036 - PPL/LAPL learning objectives in the Meteorological Information part of the PPL/LAPL syllabus.

Rationale:

Member States should develop proportionate learning objectives in the 'Meteorological Information' part of the PPL/LAPL syllabus.

State Objective:

To develop learning objectives of a basic, non-academic nature and address key learning objectives in relation to:

- practical interpretation of ground-based weather radar, strengths and weaknesses;
- practical interpretation of meteorological satellite imagery, strengths and weaknesses;
- forecasts from numerical weather prediction models, strengths and weaknesses.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Learning objectives, with related question bank.	2025
Feedback on implementation	2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	To develop proportionate learning objectives to strengthen the competency of PPL and LAPL pilots in meteorological information.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	PPL and LAPL training programmes updated with learning objectives concerning meteorological information. *MST.0036*	Continuous

SYS.MST.035 – Oversight capabilities/focus area: fraud cases in Part-147

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 2.4, MST.0035 - Oversight capabilities/focus area: fraud cases in Part-147.

Rationale:

Part-147 organisations play a crucial role in aviation training for maintenance personnel. It is therefore essential that such organisations and oversight authorities ensure that the competence level is achieved in a fair and correct way. Stakeholders must ensure that necessary control measures are in place, and any changes are conducted in a controlled manner.

State Objective:

To focus on mitigating the risk of fraud in examinations, including by adding specific items in audit checklists and collecting data on the actual cases of fraud. Exchanging and sharing information about known cases will also contribute towards achieving wider knowledge and implementation of best practices during oversight.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Provide feedback on the implementation status.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Ensure that proper feedback is recorded and provided to EASA as appropriate.

Aviation organisations	Provide feedback to TM-CAD on known cases of examination frauds.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	Ensure that feedback channels are in place and that the related outcome is shared with EASA when requested. *MST.0035*	Continuous

Status:

TM-CAD treats cases of fraud or tentative fraud in a serious manner. Reporting channels are available for organisations that identify any wrongdoings. In addition, as part of its oversight cycle, TM-CAD conducts checks at examination locations from among its approved organisations.

3.3 Operational Safety and Proportionality

3.3.1 Flight operations - aeroplanes

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 3, Flight operations – aeroplanes

The operational domain CAT and NCC by aeroplane remains the greatest focus of the EASA safety activities. This sub-section provides insight on actions in the area of CAT by aeroplane (airlines and air taxi, passengers/cargo, aeroplanes of all mass categories), non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft (NCC), as well as specialised operations (SPO) involving aeroplanes of all mass categories.

The higher risk KRAs for CAT and NCC operations in terms of aggregated ERCS score are airborne collision, collision on runway, aircraft upset and runway excursion (EASA ASR 2024 Appendix 2).

In addition to the above KRA's, the following safety events shall also be monitored by TM-CAD safety analysis and taken into consideration by the respective CAT operators:

- Security.

OPS.MST.003 – Maintain regular dialogue with aircraft operators on FDM programmes

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 1.2, MST.0003 - Member States should maintain a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring programmes.

Rationale:

Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) offers an efficient solution to enhance safety in the aviation industry. By downloading and analysing aircraft flight recorder data on a regular and routine

basis, this element is of importance to an organisation's safety management. The increased capture and analysis of data parameters has enhanced the potential of FDM programmes. TM-CAD fully embraces the importance of such FDM programmes in an organisation and promotes the importance of such analysis as an additional support tool for both safety management and organisational operational efficiency.

State Objective:

TM-CAD strives to promote the use and analysis of such programmes, together with encouraging the use of good-practice documents. Additionally, TM-CAD will share relevant information to increase awareness about the European operators FDM forum (EOFDM).

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Information on EOFDM published in the SMS section of TM-CAD website	2025
Detailed report of the workshop	2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Promote the importance of FDM programmes via appropriate forums and/or conferences.
Aviation organisations	AOC holders (CAT): Participate in FDM-related events organised by TM-CAD. Analyse operational demands and pursue paths allowing for FDM analysis.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	Encourage operators to make use of good-practice documents produced by EOFDM and similar safety initiatives, through promotion and by means of TM-CAD safety newsletter. *MST.0003*	2025
ii	Publish relevant documentation on TM-CAD website. *MST.0003*	2025

OPS.MST.019 – Better understanding of operators' governance structure

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 3.1.1, MST.0019 - Better understanding of operators' governance structure.

Rationale:

Group operations have been a reality for many years as the current regulatory framework does not prevent the implementation of such business model. However, clear boundaries for an effective set-up need to be established, and which is further supported by an adequate and efficient level of oversight.

The following guidance related to the oversight of group operations also is to be considered: https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/general-publications/guidance-oversight-group-operations

It is the responsibility of the organisations' management to ensure that any threats associated with the business model are addressed in the company's SMS, including change management procedures where required.

State Objective:

Identify the various business models and the related risks to their operation.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Guidance material.	2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Information gathering and oversight.
Aviation organisations	AOC holders (CAT): Risk management, SMS and Compliance monitoring functions.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	Update of guidance material related to group operations *MST.0019*	2025

OPS.MST.024 – 'Due regard' for the safety of civil traffic

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 3.1.1, MST.0024 – 'Due regard' for the safety of civil traffic over high seas.

Rationale:

There are two major airspace users in the world today - civil and military, with both sectors being essential to global stability and economies. However, both usually cannot operate simultaneously within the same block of airspace, thus requiring the establishment of boundaries and segregation to safeguard both civil and military aviation airspace activity.

Several EU Member States have reported an increase in losses of separation involving civil and military aircraft including an increase in non-cooperative military traffic over the high seas. Due

to the possible hazard to civil aviation safety, the EC mandated EASA to perform a technical analysis of the reported occurrences.

State Objective:

Organisations under TM-CAD oversight shall assess the relevance of the safety issues listed in this safety risk portfolio to their own operations and, where appropriate, capture them in their management systems so that any associated risks can be mitigated effectively.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Report to EASA on related incidents and actions taken.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Report relevant events to EASA and monitor developments including evaluating and endorsing any recommendations issued by regional or international bodies.
Aviation organisations	Report to TM-CAD any encounters with military operated aircraft.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	Report relevant occurrences to EASA. *MST.0024*	Continuous

3.3.2 Rotorcraft

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 4, Rotorcraft.

On a regional level, the aim of the EASA Roadmap is to significantly reduce the number of rotorcraft accidents and incidents across the spectrum of operations. The strategy incorporates safety and transversal issues that are affected by related functions such as training, operations, initial and continuing airworthiness, environment and innovation. To date in Malta, there were no major events deriving from helicopter operations.

This area includes three types of operations involving certified helicopters:

- Commercial Air Transport (CAT) operations, passenger and cargo conducted by EASA Member States' AOC holders, including passenger and cargo flights to and from offshore oil and gas installations in CAT;
- Specialised Operations (SPO), such as advertisement, photography, with an EASA Member State as the State of operator or State of registry; and
- Non-Commercial Operations (NCO) with helicopters registered in an EASA Member State or for which an EASA Member State is the State of operator (this section includes in particular training flights).

The top three identified key risk areas for rotorcraft, for all types of operation, are terrain collision (CFIT), aircraft upset (loss of control) and airborne collision.

In view of the above, the related KRA's must be risk assessed by the respective helicopter operator and ensure measures are in place to help reduce such threats.

ROT.MST.015 – Helicopter Safety events

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 4.1, MST.0015 - Helicopter Safety events.

Rationale:

CAs, in partnership with industry representatives, are encouraged to organise helicopter safety events annually or every two years. The EHEST, IHST, CA, Heli Offshore or other sources of safety promotion materials could be freely used and promoted.

State Objective:

It is our objective to ensure a high level of safety among rotorcraft users and TM-CAD is committed in ensuring that this safety is maintained, even if the rotorcraft activity is much less than fixed-wing operations.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Organise safety events.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Coordinate with industry representatives to organise helicopter safety events/disseminate promotional material to increase safety awareness within this domain.
Aviation organisations	Promote safety awareness among its operational levels.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	To coordinate helicopter safety events and/or promotional material *MST.0015*	Continuous

ROT.MST.041 – Harmonisation in Helicopter AOC approvals, procedures and documents

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 3.1.3, MST.0041 - Harmonisation in Helicopter AOC approvals, procedures, and documents

Rationale:

Member States should harmonise and, to the extent possible, simplify the application processes in the area of commercial operations with helicopters, including the use of common application forms and compliance lists.

State Objective:

TM-CAD will follow, participate and support the development of this task together with the Helicopter Expert Group, a Subgroup of the Air OPS TEB.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Paper to harmonise the AOC issue/change process (with interface to CAMOs and ATOs)	2025
Paper to harmonise the process to add/remove an aircraft from the AOC	2026
Paper to harmonise the process of a common application form for approval/ removal of an item from the MEL	2026
Paper to promote the simplification processes, including the use of common application forms, compliance lists, etc.	2025
Paper to harmonise the process in implementation of the EFB provisions	2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Harmonisation and simplification of: - the application processes in CAT helicopters, - the use of common application forms and compliance lists
Aviation organisations	Participate in industry discussions and standardise internal processes.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	Follow, participate and support the development of this task together with the Helicopter Expert Group. *MST.0041*	2025

3.3.3 General Aviation

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 5, General Aviation

General Aviation (GA) has been since its origin the cradle for innovation and recruitment of young professionals and a means to connect people across Europe. Addressing safety risks in GA in a proportionate and effective manner is a strategic priority. In the last years, accidents involving recreational aeroplanes have led the GA to be one sectors of aviation with the highest yearly number of fatalities across Europe.

Based on the data for non-commercially operated small aeroplanes (MTOMs below 5,700kg), the following top three KRAs for GA aircraft can be highlighted: Aircraft upset, Airborne collision and Runway excursion.

GA.MST.025 – Dissemination of safety messages

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 5.1.1, MST.0025 - Improvement in the dissemination of safety messages.

Rationale:

Sharing of safety information is a key element to increase awareness of threats and help identify safety issues and related mitigation measures.

State Objective:

It is our objective to ensure a safe environment for all GA users, especially since Malta has a particular scenario whereby all GA activities on the island depart and land at an International Airport.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Safety-related workshops or forums.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Promote safety information.
Aviation organisations	Ensure a proactive approach on providing, creating, and disseminating information to respective users.

Actions		***Target Date***
i	Share and appropriately disseminate information among the GA community, including by means of safety workshops and safety days/evenings	Continuous
	MST.0025	

GA.MST.027 – Safety culture in GA

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 5.1.1, MST.0027 - Promotion of safety culture in GA.

Rationale:

TM-CAD promotes a culture in which it aims, in particular, to ensure confidence of aviation professionals in occurrence reporting systems and encourages them to report any relevant safety information with a view to contribute to the enhancement of aviation safety and accident prevention. To this end, TM-CAD requires organisations to adopt just culture principles in their procedures and Safety Management.

Nevertheless, just culture must not be used to exonerate individuals from their responsibilities but rather to find a balance between full impunity and blame culture. However, TM-CAD and legislation provide exceptions to the principle of just culture. Exceptions are granted in cases of wilful misconduct, and situations where there has been a manifest, severe and serious disregard of an obvious risk and profound failure of professional responsibility to take such care as is evidently required in the circumstances, causing foreseeable damage to a person or property, or which seriously compromises the level of aviation safety.

State Objective:

The State's objective to ensure that all GA users, and all aviation professionals, are aware of a strong just culture within the Maltese aviation environment and hence occurrence reporting is encouraged as a means to improve safety within the industry.

Deliverables	***Timeline***
Provisions to facilitate and promote safety culture as part of SSP/SPAS.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Provide support and guidance on implementing an effective safety culture, whilst ensuring that this is also being implemented in organisations under its oversight.
Aviation organisations	Embrace a safety culture, including just culture and encouraging occurrence reporting within their management systems.

Action		***Target Date***
i	Provisions to facilitate and promote safety culture as part of SSP/SPAS, through promotion by TM-CAD and by sharing guidance issued by EASA and other regulatory bodies. *MST.0027*	Continuous
ii	Provide the necessary support to encourage occurrence reporting. *MST.0027*	Continuous

GA.MST.038 – Airspace complexity and traffic congestion

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Volume II, Chapter 5.1.1, MST.0038 - Airspace complexity and traffic congestion.

State Objective:

To consider 'airspace complexity' and 'traffic congestion' as safety-relevant factors in airspace changes affecting uncontrolled traffic, including the changes along international borders.

Deliverable(s)	***Timeline***
Best Practices	2025
Feedback on implementation	2025

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor and promote the importance of Airspace infringement, Deconfliction of IFR and VFR traffic, Airborne separation
Aviation organisations	Ensure that all Pilots, aircraft operators, NCAs, ANSPs report, monitor and mitigate events of Airspace infringement, Deconfliction of IFR and VFR traffic, Airborne separation

Action		***Target Date***
i	Provide feedback on implementation and any best practices adopted for these safety-relevant factors *MST.0038*	2025
ii	Provide the necessary support to encourage occurrence reporting. *MST.0038*	Continuous

3.3.4 ATM/ANS

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Vol II, Chapter 8, Air traffic management/air navigation services (ATM/ANS).

There is still a lack of harmonised rules based on ICAO SARPs to ensure compliance with the essential requirements that apply to ATM/ANS. In addition, Regulation (EC) No 552/2004 has been repealed, so new rules must ensure that ATM/ANS systems and their constituents are successfully designed, manufactured, and installed. If not, the achievement of the overall objectives of ATM/ANS may be compromised.

The top KRAs for ATM/ANS as identified in the EPAS 2025 are: Collision on runway and Airborne collision.

3.3.5 Aerodromes

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Vol II, Chapter 9, Aerodromes.

This sub-section addresses aerodrome design and operations, as well as aerodrome operators with a focus on safety and management of potential risks. The ultimate aim is to maintain a high uniform level of safety across Member States, ensuring compliance with the ICAO SARPs and a harmonised approach which will support the free movement of services within the Member States.

The top three KRAs for aerodromes and ground handling as identified in the EPAS 20254 are aircraft upset, collision on runway, followed by other injuries.

3.3.6 Unmanned aircraft systems and manned VTOL-capable aircraft

EPAS 2025 Edition reference: Vol II, Chapter 10, Unmanned aircraft systems and manned VTOL-capable aircraft.

Enabling the safe integration of UAS (also commonly called ‘drones’), being a fast evolving and emerging market segment, as well as of VTOL-capable aircraft, also intended for urban air mobility operations, continues to be a high-priority activity. To ensure safe UAS operations and mitigate the risks, it is important to manage the safe integration of UASs into the airspace. On airspace integration, the U-space is a set of new services and specific procedures designed to support the safe, efficient, and secure access to airspace for a large number of drones.

3.4 Enhancing operational safety and promotion

The SPAS in Malta also includes the threats identified at international level. Specifically, this section includes those MST actions related to specific threats that need to be assessed and mitigated:

- Loss of control in flight (LOC-I)
- Runway excursions (RE)
- Runway incursions (RI)
- AIRPROX/Mid-air collisions (MAC)
- Ground safety
- Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)
- Fire, smoke and fumes
- Airspace infringement (AI)

In addition, this section will identify specific threats within Malta airspace, and which must be risk assessed by the relevant parties, namely:

- Management of Fatigue
- Threats of Laser Attacks

- Threats from Firework displays
- Safe operation of UAS

Nevertheless, due to the dynamic nature that aviation operates in, it is important that all aviation stakeholders identify and assess risks related to their operation and mitigate against new safety risks.

CAD.MST.004 – Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)

Source: EPAS (2022-2026)

Rationale:

Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime which is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always, at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved. Prevention of loss of control is a strategic priority.

State Objective:

Reduce LOC-I risks by means of data gathering from clear occurrence reporting, efficient organisational FDM analysis and effective mitigation measures.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Identify events of LOC-I and monitor for threats. Include LOC-I in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC, ATO, ANS, ADR, SPO: Operators must process LOC-I threats as part of their safety management, including but not limited to: • assessing risks in their own operations; • define the ALoS including the necessary management and response levels; • define and implement the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.MST.007 – Runway Excursions (RE)

Source: EPAS (2022-2026)

Rationale:

Runway excursions cover materialised runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties in maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing.

State Objective:

Reduce REs by continuously assessing and improving risk control measures.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor events of REs to identify threats and trends. Include RE in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC holders, ATOs, ANS, ADR, SPO: Identify and address RE threats based on operations and as part of their safety management, including but not limited to: • assessing risks in their own operations; • define the ALoS including the necessary management and response levels; • define and implement the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions. Process and implement Runway safety recommendations/solutions published by regional or international groups.

CAD.MST.014 – Runway Incursions (RI)

Source: EPAS (2022-2026)

Rationale:

Runway incursions (RI) refer to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection, which can potentially lead to runway collision as the most credible accident outcome.

State Objective:

Reduce RIs by continuously assessing and improving risk control measures.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor events of RIs to identify threats and trends. Include RI in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC holders, ATOs, ANS, ADR, SPO: Identify and address RI threats based on operations and as part of their safety management, including but not limited to: • assessing risks in their own operations; • define the ALoS including the necessary management and response levels; • define and implement the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions. Process and implement Runway safety recommendations/solutions published by regional or international groups.

CAD.MST.010 – Mid-Air Collision

Source: EPAS (2022-2026)

Rationale:

Airborne conflict refers to both actual collisions as well as near misses in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisories or airspace infringements. This key risk area has been raised by several Member States through the NoA and by some airlines, specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by aircraft without transponders in uncontrolled airspace. This is one specific safety issue that is a main priority in this key risk area.

State Objective:

Assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor events of Airprox/Mid-air Collision to identify threats and trends. Include Airprox/MAC events in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC, SPO, ATO, ANS: Organisations must process Airprox/ Mid-air Collision threats as part of their safety management by • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions. Assess and implement effective procedures based on evidence and technology-driven assisting tools which help avoid/inform about potential conflicts.

CAD.MST.018 – Ground Safety

Source: EPAS (2018-2022)

Rationale:

Ground-handling and apron management is an important process within the overall turnaround of an aircraft operation. The safety element at such stage of operation is crucial, especially when considering the different levels of service providers roaming around the aircraft from arrival to its departure. On a regional level, it has been noticed that the risk score for such operations warranted the inclusion as part of a stand-alone domain.

State Objective:

Assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk from ground-safety and ramp-management events.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor ground-safety events for threats and trends. Include ground-safety in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC, GH, ANS, ADR: Addressing threats to ground handling and apron management in their operations. Organisations must process these threats as part of their safety management by • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.MST.005 – Fire, Smoke and Fumes

Source: EPAS (2018-2022)

Rationale:

Uncontrolled fire on board an aircraft, especially when in flight, represents one of the most severe hazards in aviation. In-flight fire can ultimately lead to loss of control, either as a result of structural or control system failure, or again as a result of crew incapacitation. Fire on the ground can take hold rapidly and lead to significant casualties if evacuation and emergency response is not swift enough. Smoke or fumes, whether they are associated with fire or not, can lead to passenger and crew incapacitation and will certainly raise concern and invite a response. Even when they do not give rise to a safety impact, they can give rise to concerns and need to be addressed.

State Objective:

Assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk from fire, smoke and fumes events.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor fire, smoke and fumes events for threats and trends. Include fire, smoke and fumes in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	AOC, AIR, ATO: Addressing threats to fire, smoke and fumes in their operations. Organisations must process these threats as part of their safety management by • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.MST.006 – Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)

Source: EPAS (2022-2026)

Rationale:

This risk area includes the controlled collision with terrain together with undershoot or overshoot of the runway during approach and landing phases. It comprises situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima among others.

State Objective:

Assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk from CFIT.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor CFIT events for threats and trends. Include CFIT in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	Addressing threats to CFIT in their operations. Organisations must process these threats as part of their safety management by • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.TM.001 – Safety Risk Management

Source: EPAS (2022-2026)

Rationale:

Safety risk management encompasses the various sectors of the Maltese aviation industry under TM-CAD oversight, with the aim of defining acceptable levels of safety to ensure a secure operational environment for all users. However, each stakeholder remains accountable for the safety of their own operations. As part of their Safety Management System (SMS), every aviation organisation is required to identify operational hazards and threats, assess associated risks, determine an acceptable risk level, and implement measures to eliminate or mitigate those risks.

State Objective:

To maintain an effective safety risk management framework and comply with ICAO and EASA requirements in such domain.

Deliverable(s)	***Timeline***
The identification of national aviation safety risks and included within the SPAS in Malta.	Continuous

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Implement a safety risk framework to identify operational risks across domains and implemented in the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	Implement safety risk management frameworks relevant to their operation and organisation.

CAD.TM.002 – Management of Fatigue risks

Source: National

Rationale:

Fatigue is the end-effect following a particular cause or activity that affects an individual's ability to conduct the task in a normal way, potentially leading to an unsafe execution of the task at hand. Fatigue may happen in a relatively short time after some significant physical or mental activity (acute) or else it may occur gradually over several days or weeks.

State Objective:

While regulatory frameworks are aimed to help reduce fatigue related events and risks, this will still occur due to the various operational challenges and scenarios within the aviation industry. In view of this, TM-CAD will monitor organisations' fatigue risk monitoring and processes to help mitigate the risk and prevent operation under fatigue conditions.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor fatigue-related events for threats and trends. Include Fatigue-related events in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	Fatigue risk management procedures, including managing crew fatigue, quality sleep, roster planning among others all in relation to its business operation. Consideration should also be taken for extended flight duty periods.

CAD.TM.003 – Laser Attacks

Source: National

Rationale:

Laser attacks undermine the safety and security of flight operations. They can interfere with a pilot's vision and limit the crew's ability to perform their duties. Similarly, laser attacks can cause operational problems in ATC towers. There are four primary areas of concern that can jeopardise flight safety:

a) Distraction and startle
b) Glare and disruption

c) Temporary flash blindness
d) Eye damage

State Objective:

Along the past years, this phenomenon has been constantly reported, showing increasing fluctuating trends. Mitigation and control measures are highly dependent on the origin of the laser attack. Nevertheless, CAD will monitor for effectiveness the cooperation agreements currently in place between the service providers (ATC and operators) together with the local Police Force. In addition, CAD will continue monitoring laser attacks reported in Maltese airspace and on a European level.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor Laser attack events for threats and trends. Include Laser Attacks in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	Addressing threats to Laser attack events in their operations. Organisations must process these threats as part of their safety management by • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.TM.004 – Firework displays

Source: National

Rationale:

Many fireworks related to large-scale events can dispense combustible material several hundred meters into the air. Traditionally, Malta's skies are full of colour during the Summer months, mainly due to the local patron Saint celebrations held in each village. Given that the Luqa aerodrome is surrounded by villages offering such pyrotechnic displays, it is essential that the letting-off of such fireworks are known to the aerodrome and airline operators.

Even though history has shown that the risk of collision with cruising aircraft is small (depending on type of operation), there is a significant threat during the take-off and landing phases of flight. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that fireworks have the potential to distract and confuse aircrews if they encounter fireworks at low altitudes, specifically on approach to landing.

State Objective:

Along the years, the CAD was in receipt of MORs from crew members and/or the Luqa aerodrome operator regarding firework displays. These were mostly in relation to displays not being notified beforehand or in breach of the allocated timeframe. A collaboration between the Luqa aerodrome operator, Malta Police Force and Firework factory groups, is in place, which has allowed for safe control of this entertainment and low-reporting numbers. Nevertheless, the

CAD will continue monitoring for effectiveness the cooperation agreements currently in place between the parties involved and explore any relevant improvements.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Monitor firework display events for threats and trends. Include Firework threats in Appendix I of the SPAS in Malta.
Aviation organisations	Addressing threats to Firework related events in their operations. Organisations must process these threats as part of their safety management by • assessing risks relevant to their own operations; • defining the ALoS and the necessary management and response levels; • defining and implementing the required actions; • monitor the effectiveness of their actions.

CAD.TM.005 – Safety promotion of Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Source: National

Rationale:

As part of the continuous changing landscape in aviation, legislation for unmanned aircraft has also been introduced at a regional level (EU) and enhanced by national legislation where appropriate. The European Commission's regulation of unmanned aircraft systems utilises a risk-based approach, which incorporates each stakeholders' personal responsibility for risk management based on their operations.

As part of CAD's strategy to maintain safe operations in this changing sector, the CAD will use all channels available to share safety-related information to UAS users. These channels include, but not limited to, the Directorate's website, social media platforms and TV appearances.

State Objective:

The CAD's objective is to primarily reduce the risks associated with unmanned aircraft operations to ensure a safe and prosperous environment for both hobbyists and commercial operations. Promotion, support and sharing of information are all steps that help raise awareness at different levels of operation and UAS categories. Each category is considered in its own type of operation however it cannot be seen in isolation to the whole UAS spectrum.

Stakeholders – Roles and responsibilities	
TM-CAD	Provide the necessary guidance material on safe use of unmanned aircraft. Promote local and regional legislative requirement for the safe operation of drones.

UAS Operators	Unmanned aircraft users shall use the appropriate platform for registration of drones (https://tmcad.idronect.com/) and seek information from the appropriate websites (such as EASA - https://www.easa.europa.eu/domains/civil-drones-rpas and TM - https://www.transport.gov.mt/aviation/drones-4444).

3.5 Safety threats for individual domains

Each domain has its share of threats related to its operation. By identifying the necessary safety nets and measuring their effectiveness, these threats can be managed and maintained at an acceptable risk level to ensure the safest operational possibility.

Appendix I addresses each of the domains and is presented in the form of a table to address the safety objective. The data source for such objectives derives from multiple sources, including EPAS recommendations and analysis of MORs submitted to the national database.

It is the responsibility of the organisation that each of these objectives are analysed and extract a realistic set of SPIs and SPTs. Each objective must take into consideration any underlying pre-cursors, which if unaddressed, may develop into a significant incident or accident.

Organisations are to also take into consideration other operational challenges such as reduced staff at various levels of operation, skill degradation and re-training requirements, technical support and staff turnover among others. The rise in various conflict zones around the globe needs to also be taken into consideration.

A risk assessment is required from the individual domain operators/organisations to ensure that these are relevant to their type of operation and mitigated appropriately. Nevertheless, this list is non-exhaustive and may be further enhanced by the respective organisation based on the type of operation it conducts.

Appendix I – Safety Objectives, SPI and SPT

This Appendix provides an overview of the Safety Objective's SPI and SPT at Both National and Operator level. Additionally, this section will provide a list of Compliance Performance Indicators monitored by TM-CAD. Items a. and b. are addressed to TM-CAD, while item c. is aimed at the operators/organisations based on their operational domain.

The data in this appendix is gathered from multiple sources, including occurrence reports, USOAP implementation and standardisation visits and resulting into specific SPI and SPT.

a. Compliance performance indicators monitored by TM-CAD

The following tables present a list of Compliance Performance Indicators monitored by TM-CAD and also the Systemic and Operational-level safety objectives SPIs and SPTs at National level.

Compliance Performance Indicators: TM-CAD

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Reaction to any shortcomings and the implementation of corrective measures for continuous improvement.	Findings raised during EASA or ICAO visits are addressed and corrected in the stipulated timeframe.	Excluding issues beyond TM-CAD's control, the CAD shall strive to complete a minimum of 90% of the findings within the agreed deadline.
Compliance of Safety Standards and procedures with ICAO standards and EU regulatory requirements.	USOAP Effective Implementation % Findings classified as being of an Immediate Safety Concern during EASA standardisation visits / Significant Safety Concern for ICAO audits.	Malta aims at increasing the Effective Implementation score progressively, following each USOAP validation mission. The effective implementation score following the ICVM 2021 stands at 77.94%. Malta has no Immediate Safety Concerns (raised by EASA during standardisation visits), or Significant Safety Concerns (raised by ICAO during audits).
Safety standards and operating models are to meet the EU regulatory requirements.	Implement new EU requirements.	Implementation is always performed by the issued deadline for each domain.
The safety standards and procedures comply with ICAO standards and EU requirements.	Implementation level of the Malta SSP is evaluated in accordance with ICAO criteria.	SSP full implementation as provided in the ICAO GASP timeline.

b. National objectives

National : Systemic-level		
Safety Objective	**SPI**	**SPT**
To publish and maintain the *Malta SSP* and *SPAS in Malta* as key elements in identifying aviation threats and risks within a safety structure.	Key risk areas are assessed by all aviation stakeholders and considered based on their operation.	The Malta SSP and SPAS will be reviewed on an annual basis to ensure that Actions and Safety Objectives at National and operational level are kept relevant.
To support organisations under TM-CAD oversight to implement an effective SMS compliant to regulations.	(TM-CAD) SMS oversight requirements are established in all domains. (Organisations) SMS requirements are established and understood by management.	All domains with an oversight function in the CAD will have such provisions in place pursuant to regulatory requirements. All organisations will have an active SMS in their organisation, which will be audited as part of an audit cycle by the respective CAD Unit.
To implement an organisation risk profile across all CAD domains as part of its Risk-based Oversight function.	An organisation risk profile and scoring framework is created and used to assist in planning of the oversight by the CAD inspectors	Each CAD Unit will have its own organisation profile for its oversight function. The risk profile shall have measurable parameters and scoring range to allow for a risk score outcome.

	To ensure that TM-CAD has the necessary human resources to conduct its oversight responsibilities.	Man-hour plan calculation is conducted taking into consideration the current operational environment and predicted growth of the Directorate. An oversight plan is created, ensuring that all organisations follow a pre-defined audit cycle.	Each CAD inspecting unit will have a man-hour plan relevant to its duties including its oversight capability function. This plan is to be prepared on an annual basis and shall be kept relevant to reflect available resources and workload. Achieve at least an 85% completion rate of the annual planned audits. The audits shall be carried out within the established timeframe also take into consideration Risk-Based Oversight.
	To Identify Safety Objectives across all domains within the *SPAS in Malta* and review as required.	Safety Objectives are identified and further enhanced by process-oriented and outcome-oriented SPIs and SPTs for each domain.	Annual review and development of the SPIs and SPTs based on data gathered and feedback from stakeholders.
	To implement and maintain an aviation safety management framework.	Implementation of the actions published in the SPAS in Malta.	Each Action has its own target. The CAD will monitor these actions through liaison between the CAD relevant Units and the stakeholder/s. The SCU shall maintain record of such monitoring and present internally on an annual basis.
	To maintain a safe aviation operating environment when exceptional circumstance(s) disrupt aviation operations including CAD oversight functions.	Applicable processes are to be followed. Ad-hoc procedures may be introduced in order to ensure that there is an immediate reaction to the circumstance.	The CAD shall monitor the aviation environment and react to any extraordinary circumstances that may arise. This process shall be documented through a Safety Risk Assessment and identify appropriate mitigation measures. A review period for the identified mitigation measures shall be established to ensure their effectiveness.

National : Operational-level		
Safety Objective	**SPI**	**SPT**
To maintain a high level of aviation operational safety and ensure that accidents are not caused due to negligence in the Maltese aviation system.	**Number of aviation accidents** (Measuring factor: absolute number and in proportion to traffic activity) *NAT.ACC.1:* *- all events classified as such and that occurred in Malta* *- all events classified as such and that occurred elsewhere than in Malta to Malta-registered aircraft or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese licence.* *NAT.ACC.2* *- all events classified as such and that occurred to Malta-registered aircraft and/or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese license.*	CAT: The aim is to maintain a 'zero' accident rate. Average CAT accident rate is as follows: - year 2020 was at 0.41/100,000 FH; - year 2021 was at 0.18/100,000 FH; - year 2022 was at 0.19/100,000 FH - year 2023 was at 0/100,000 FH. CAT accident rate for 2024 is at 0/100,000 FH. GA and recreational aviation: The aim is to maintain a 'zero' accident rate. GA movement at LMML in 2024 stood at 13,778. Accident rate is as follows: - average across 2020-2022 was at 1.08/10,000 movements; - in 2023 and 2024 the rate stood at 0/10,000 movements.

		Number of fatal aviation accidents (Measuring factor: absolute number and in proportion to traffic activity) *NAT.FAC.1:* *- all events classified as such and that occurred in Malta* *- all events classified as such and that occurred elsewhere than in Malta to Malta-registered aircraft or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese licence.* *NAT.FAC.2* *- all events classified as such and that occurred to Malta-registered aircraft and/or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese license.*	CAT: The aim is to maintain a 'zero' fatality rate. No recorded fatalities during period 2018-2024. GA: The aim is to maintain a 'zero' fatality rate. No recorded fatalities during period 2018-2024.
	To maintain a high level of aviation operational safety.	**Number of aviation serious incidents** (Measuring factor – absolute number and in proportion to traffic activity) *NAT.SER.1:* *- all events classified as such and that occurred in Malta* *- all events classified as such and that occurred elsewhere than in Malta to Malta-registered aircraft or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese licence.* *NAT.SER.2* *- all events classified as such and that occurred to Malta-registered aircraft and/or to aircraft operated by a Maltese operator or with Maltese license.*	CAT: The aim is to maintain a downward trend in 'serious incident' classification. Nevertheless, each event has to be taken on a case-by-case basis, since TM-CAD classifies report on the 'Worst Possible Outcome' scenario. Average CAT serious incident rate between period 2020-2022 stands at 13/100,000 FH. Serious incident rate for 2023 was at 6/100,000 FH whilst for 2024 it stands at 0.5/100,000 FH; Monitor the GA serious incident rate and evaluate against FH or local movements.

	To maintain a high level of runway safety.	**Runway Excursions (RE)** *NAT.RE.1*	- RE in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - No accidents or serious incident categorised as RE. - CAD to monitor implementation of EAPPRE recommendations. - Acceptance of organisation's Safety Objectives and related SPI/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process RE threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes. - Reducing trends in RE occurrences and precursor events.
		Runway Incursions (RI) *NAT.RI.1* *(this includes incursions by other aircraft, vehicles or persons which are present on the runway without clearance or incorrectly.)*	- RI risks in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - No accidents or serious incident categorised as RI. - Monitoring implementation of EAPPRI recommendations. - Acceptance of organisation's Safety Objectives and related SPI/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process RI threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes. - Reducing trends in RI occurrences and precursor events.

	To maintain a high level of aviation operational safety.	**Near misses and Mid-air collisions (MAC)** *NAT.MAC.1*	- MAC risks in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - No accidents categorised as MAC. - Monitoring implementation of EU EAPAIRR addressing Airspace infringement. - Acceptance of organisation's Safety Objectives and related SPI/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process MAC threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes. - Reducing trends in MAC occurrences and precursor events on organisation and sector basis.
		Controlled Flight Into or towards Terrain (CFIT) *NAT.CFIT.1*	- CFIT risks in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - No accidents categorised as CFIT. - Acceptance of organisation's Safety Objectives and related SPI/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process CFIT threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes. - Reducing trends in CFIT occurrences and precursor events on organisation and sector basis.

		Loss of Control in flight (LOC-I) *NAT.LOCI.1*	- LOC-I risks in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - No accidents categorised as LOC-I. - Acceptance of organisation's Safety Objectives and related SPIT/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process LOC-I threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes. - Reducing trends in LOC-I occurrences and precursor events on organisation and sector basis.
	To maintain a high level of aviation operational safety.	**Ground Collision (G-COL)** *NAT.GCOL.1*	- G-COL risks in Malta will be monitored through the CAD annual safety review publication to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable levels. - No accidents categorised as G-COL. - Acceptance of organisation's Safety Objectives and related SPIT/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process G-COL threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes

To maintain a high level of ground handling operational safety.	**Ground Handling Operations** *NAT.RAMP.1*	- No fatal accidents during ground operations - Acceptance of organisation's Safety Objectives and related SPI/SPTs. These shall be assessed during initial approval and subsequently during each SMS oversight. - Organisations are to process ground handling operation threats in relation to their operation and their own safety management processes - Reducing trends in ground operations related accidents, serious incidents and occurrences on organisation and sector basis.
To maintain a high level of UAS operational safety.	**Unmanned Aircraft Systems** *NAT.UAS.1*	- Have no infringements of no-fly zones/restricted areas without prior notification and mitigation measures. - Permits of use are issued based on regulatory requirements. - A comprehensive UAS database to ensure traceability and control.

c. Objectives for Operators/Organisations by domain

The following tables present a list of Safety objectives that each Operator/Organisation shall analyse and risk-assess based on their operations. These objectives shall not replace any other specific threats identified by the operator/organisation.

The tables will provide will apply for the following areas of operation:

- Aerodrome
- ATM/ANS
- Commercial Air Transport
- Ground Handling
- General Aviation
- Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
- Airworthiness and Maintenance Organisations

In the SPI column, certain indicators might have one of the following 'layer number' attributed to it:

'Layer 1' - Identifies the main occurrence category as presented in the ADREP taxonomy fields.

'Layer 2' - Specific events that are part of particular occurrence categories and/or pre-cursors to an event.

Note: The layer numbers specified are for event tracking purposes and do not constitute any level of importance.

Aerodrome		
Safety Objective	**SPI**	**SPT**
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	**Performance of the organisation's SMS**	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To maintain a high level of runway safety	**Layer 1: Runway Excursion**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

		Layer 1: Runway Incursion (vehicle, aircraft or person)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Implementation of EU EAPPRI recommendations as appropriate. - Implementation of SESAR solutions as feasible
	To maintain a high level of aerodrome movement surfaces in relation to aircraft movement areas.	**Layer 2: Aerodrome surface conditions**	- Identify and assess surface deficiencies. - Support surface condition monitoring with an effective preventive maintenance programme.
	To maintain a high level of safety in relation to FOD in aerodrome areas.	**Layer 2: FOD control in manoeuvring areas and apron**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Introduce/Evaluate mitigation measures and review their effectiveness as appropriate.
	To maintain a high level of safety in relation to wildlife control in the aerodrome including potential bird strikes and wildlife collisions.	**Layer 1: Bird strikes**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Introduce/Evaluate mitigation measures and review their effectiveness as appropriate.

	To maintain a high level of safety in relation to ground operations in aerodrome movement and manoeuvring areas.	**Layer 1: RAMP- Ground Handling**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPIs, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Enhance safety promotion among Ground handling service providers.
	To maintain a high level of safety in relation to approach and take-off/initial climb paths.	**Fireworks**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of the operation of the Aerodrome. - Increased level of coordination between parties involved and enhance safety promotion.

ATM/ANS

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	**Performance of the organisation's SMS**	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To maintain a high level of runway safety	**Layer 1: Runway Excursion**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Full implementation of EU EAPPRE recommendations as appropriately feasible.

		Layer 1: Runway Incursion (vehicle, aircraft or person)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Full implementation of EU EAPPRE recommendations as appropriate. - Implementation of SESAR solutions as feasible.
	To maintain a high level of safety on movement areas	**Layer 1: Ground collisions – collisions while taxiing to or from a runway in use (GCOL)**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation.
	To maintain a high level of airspace safety.	**Layer 1: Near misses and Mid-air collisions (MAC)**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Use of operational data (ex: radar data) to support monitoring and analysis of MAC occurrences. - Full implementation of EU EAPAIRR recommendations. - Implementation of SESAR solutions as feasible. - Level of Implementation of SESAR solutions aiming to reduce the risk of mid-air collision en-route.

	To maintain a high level of airspace safety.	**Layer 2: IFR Helicopter Operations**	- Implementation of low level IFR helicopter routes in controlled airspace, as feasible (Ref SESAR Solutions Catalogue).
	To maintain a high level of ATM/ANS technical systems and relevant functions with minimal disruptions and effects on safety.	**Layer 2: Air navigation services communications system malfunctions or disruptions (TECH/COM)**	- Threats of failures to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation including any necessary control actions and their efficiency. - Failures are to be monitored for trends.
		Layer 2: Air navigation services navigation system malfunctions or disruptions (TECH/NAV)	
		Layer 2: Air navigation services surveillance system malfunctions or disruptions (TECH/COM)	
	To ensure that ATCO operational competencies and skills are maintained.	**Layer 2: Human performance and knowledge: Maintenance of ATCO skills**	- Conduct necessary assessments and identify any threats relevant to operational disruptions. - Assess and adapt as appropriate recommendations deriving from EASA published material and/or accredited ATM/ANS bodies.

	To maintain a safe and secure system from threats arising from cyber-attacks	**Cybersecurity**	- Security threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Develop processes procedures related to minimising and counteracting cybersecurity threats.
	To maintain a safe and secure system from threats arising from cyber-attacks	**GNSS Outage and Alterations / Surveillance Degradation**	- Assess and evaluate the recommendations issued from the relevant SIB as issued by EASA and/or other relevant documentation by the CAD or other accredited entities - Assess the impact of loss or anomalies of GNSS-based timing on CNS systems.

Commercial Air Transport

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	**Performance of the organisation's SMS**	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Cabin Safety Events.	**Layer 1: Cabin Safety Events** Pre-cursors to consider: - Unruly passengers	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Loss of Control In-Flight events.	**Layer 1: Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I)** Pre-cursors to consider: - Unstabilised approach - Incorrect aircraft configuration	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Use of FDM data to support monitoring and analysis of LOC-I events. - Ensuring all flight crews are trained in upset recognition and recovery (UPRT) procedures and CRM (as applicable).
	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Mid-Air collisions and near misses events.	**Layer 1: Airprox/ Mid-Air collisions (MAC)** Pre-cursors to consider: - Level Bust(s) - TCAS RA	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Use of FDM data to support monitoring and analysis of MAC events. - Full implementation of EU EAPAIRR recommendations as appropriately feasible.
	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Controlled Flight Into Terrain events.	**Layer 1: Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)** Pre-cursors to consider: - Terrain Warning - Incorrect Altimeter settings	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Use of FDM data to support monitoring and analysis of CFIT events.

	To maintain a high level of runway safety	**Layer 1: Runway Excursion**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Full implementation of EU EAPPRE recommendations as appropriately feasible.
		Layer 1: Runway Incursion (vehicle, aircraft or person)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Full implementation of EU EAPPRE recommendations as appropriate. - Implementation of SESAR solutions as feasible.
	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Laser attack events.	**Layer 2: Laser attacks**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Fatigue-related events.	**Layer 2: Fatigue**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Monitor Fatigue risk management systems and how they are addressed.
	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Fire or Smoke on aircraft events.	**Layer 1: Fire or smoke on aircraft** Pre-cursors to consider: - Aircraft component failures (incl. powerplant) - Galley area electrical failures - Lithium Batteries (Thermal runaway)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
	To maintain a safe and secure system from threats arising from cyber-attacks	**Cybersecurity**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation.
	To ensure safe operation around conflict zones and other countries affected by War	**Operations close to Conflict Zones**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Assess CZIB as issued by EASA and/or other relevant documentation by other accredited institutes. - Review any other related ad-hoc documentation and guidance material.

	To maintain a safe and secure system from threats arising from cyber-attacks	**GNSS Outage and Alterations / Surveillance Degradation**	- Assess and evaluate the recommendations issued from relevant SIB as issued by EASA and/or other relevant documentation by the CAD or other accredited entities - Ensure that flight crews are aware, trained and prepared to recognise and adequately respond to an encounter of GNSS interferences during flight. - Assess operational risks and limitations linked to the loss of on-board GNSS capability, including any on-board systems requiring inputs from a reliable GNSS signal, e.g., impact on TAWS.

Ground Handling

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	**Performance of the organisation's SMS**	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks due to ground operations and general ground handling activities.	**Poor condition and preventive maintenance of ground handling equipment**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Devise a preventive maintenance schedule. - Increase awareness among ground handling personnel about the importance of ground-handling equipment condition and monitoring.

		Adherence to Apron procedures	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Increase awareness among ground handling personnel about Apron traffic diligence.
		Ground-handling induced FOD on aircraft movement areas	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
		Collision with Aircraft / Aircraft damage	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

General Aviation

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	**Performance of the organisation's SMS**	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Loss of Control In-Flight events.	**Layer 1: Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I)** Pre-cursors to consider: - Unstabilised approach	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Ensuring all flight crews are trained at a proper level for upset recognition and recovery (UPRT) procedures.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Mid-Air collisions and near miss events.	**Layer 1: Airprox/ Mid-Air collisions (MAC)** Pre-cursors to consider: - Level Bust(s) - Situational awareness	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Controlled Flight Into Terrain events.	**Layer 1: Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)** Pre-cursors to consider: - Incorrect Altimeter settings	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To maintain a high level of runway safety	**Layer 1: Runway Excursion**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
	Layer 1: Runway Incursion (vehicle, aircraft or person)	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Fire or Smoke on aircraft events.	**Layer 1: Fire or smoke on aircraft**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

		SCF powerplant / Non-powerplant	- Threats related to ageing and high utilisation aircraft are identified and mitigated. - Monitor common failures of component serviceability and operational lifetime
	To continuously improve safety awareness among the GA community and encourage safety reporting of MORs.	**Enhance the MOR reporting knowledge among users of GA**	- Increase awareness among general aviation personnel about the importance of reporting MORs. - Enhance safety promotion among general aviation users.
	To ensure that safety awareness and root-cause of latent/repetitive issues are addressed in an effective manner.	**Root-cause analysis following an MOR event**	- Enhance the Root Cause Analysis, causal factors identification and mitigation measures for reportable events.

Rotorcraft

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	**Performance of the organisation's SMS**	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Loss of Control In-Flight events.	**Layer 1: Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I)** Pre-cursors to consider: - Unstabilised approach	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually. - Ensuring all flight crews are trained at a proper level for upset recognition and recovery (UPRT) procedures.

	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Mid-Air collisions and near miss events.	**Layer 1: Airprox/ Mid-Air collisions (MAC)** Pre-cursors to consider: - Level Bust(s) - Situational awareness	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to Controlled Flight Into Terrain events.	**Layer 1: Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)** Pre-cursors to consider: - Incorrect Altimeter settings	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
	To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to collision with obstacles or surroundings.	**Layer 1: Obstacle collision in flight**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	**Performance of the organisation's SMS**	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to mid-air collisions and near miss events between UAS and other UAS or manned aircraft.	**Mid-Air Collisions**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPT's with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to loss of control, including those due to system failures.	**Loss of Control In-Flight**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPT's with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

To continuously improve safety by assessing and mitigating the risks relating to ground collisions and impact with third party property and injuries (not involving other aircraft)	**Third Party Conflict**	- Identify risks and mitigations to avoid injury to people on the ground and possible damage to property. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPT's with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To ensure the safe operation of UAS according to airspace class.	**Flight Authorisation Conditions**	- No-Fly Zones/Restricted areas of operation are identified. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.
To maintain a safe and secure system from threats arising from cyber-attacks	**Cybersecurity**	- Cybersecurity threats to be identified and risk assessed appropriately.
To ensure operator competence to llimit incidents related to human factors and technical knowledge.	**Operator Error**	- Ensure that remote pilots and maintenance staff are adequately trained and licenced, and that currency is maintained. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPTs with a reduction in trends. These are to be developed prior to commencement of operations and reviewed annually.

Airworthiness and Maintenance Organisations

Safety Objective	SPI	SPT
Continuous development of safety performance including the implementation of an SMS.	**Performance of the organisation's SMS**	Review of the organisation's SMS for effective implementation, including correct identification of threats and risks, and implementation of required actions. Ensure that the SMS is supported by an effective occurrence reporting system that contributes towards the potential identification and management of the operational threats and risks. - Monitor for effectiveness - Assess relevant documentation and guidance material published from regulatory bodies and/or reputable entities and review procedures accordingly.
To ensure that safety threats are identified and addressed in an effective manner.	**Identification of occurrences related to the maintenance organisation's operations.**	- Identify shortcomings in maintenance activities at a level that may put aviation safety at risk. - Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation. - Development of own Safety Objectives, SPI's, SPT's with a reduction in trends and reviewed annually. - Promote timely reporting of occurrences in maintenance organisations. - Encourage a more systematic and proactive hazard identification process to uncover possible latent risks and hazards.

	To ensure the safe installation of correct aircraft parts during maintenance.	**Layer 2: Identification of correct aircraft parts delivery before installation**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation.
	To ensure the safe maintenance release and related airworthiness documentation.	**Layer 2: Airworthiness documentation management**	- Threats are to be identified and a risk assessment is carried out as part of their operation.
	To ensure safe Parking / Storage / Return to service of aircraft	**Layer 2: Contamination of the air data system/pitot static probes**	- Assess SIB's issued by EASA (as revised) and adopt recommendations (ref: SIB 2020-14). - Identify effective mitigation measures.

Appendix II – List of actions in this publication

SPAS in Malta Reference	EPAS Reference	EPAS Title
SYS.MST.001	MST.0001	Member States to give priority to the work on SSP
SYS.MST.002	MST.0002	Promotion of SMS
SYS.MST.026	MST.0026	SMS assessment
SYS.MST.028	MST.0028	Member States to establish and maintain a SPAS
SYS.MST.032	MST.0032	Oversight capabilities/focus areas
SYS.MST.033	MST.0033	Sharing of best practices for language proficiency requirements
SYS.MST.034	MST.0034	Oversight capabilities/focus area: flight time specification schemes
SYS.MST.035	MST.0035	Oversight capabilities/focus area: fraud cases in Part-147
SYS.MST.036	MST.0036	PPL/LAPL learning objectives
SYS.MST.037	MST.0037	Human Factors Competence for Regulator Staff
SYS.MST.043	MST.0043	Improvement of data quality in occurrence reporting
SYS.MST.040	MST.0040	Safety and security reporting coordination mechanism
SYS.MST.042	MST.0042	Assessment of safety culture at air operators
OPS.MST.003	MST.0003	Member States should maintain a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on FDM programmes
OPS.MST.019	MST.0019	Better understanding of operators' governance structure
OPS.MST.024	MST.0024	'Due regard' for the safety of civil traffic
ROT.MST.015	MST.0015	Helicopter Safety events
ROT.MST.041	MST.0041	Harmonisation in Helicopter AOC approvals, procedures and documents
GA.MST.025	MST.0025	Improvement in the dissemination of safety messages
GA.MST.027	MST.0027	Promotion of safety culture in GA
GA.MST.038	MST.0038	Airspace complexity and traffic congestion
CAD.MST.004	MST.004	EPAS 2018-2022: Include loss of control in flight in national SSP
CAD.MST.005	MST.005	EPAS 2018-2022: Include fire, smoke and fumes in national SSP
CAD.MST.006	MST.006	EPAS 2018-2022: Include CFIT in national SSP
CAD.MST.007	MST.007	EPAS 2018-2022: Include runway excursions in national SSP
CAD.MST.010	MST.010	EPAS 2018-2022: Include MACs in national SSP
CAD.MST.014	MST.014	EPAS 2018-2022: Include runway incursions in national SSP
CAD.MST.018	MST.018	EPAS 2018-2022: Include ground safety in national SSP
CAD.TM.001	- - - -	Include Safety Risk Management in national SSP
CAD.TM.002	- - - -	Include management of Fatigue risks in national SSP
CAD.TM.003	- - - -	Include management of Laser Attacks in national SSP
CAD.TM.004	- - - -	Include management of Firework threats in national SSP
CAD.TM.005	- - - -	Safety promotion of Unmanned Aircraft Systems

SPAS in Malta Reference	EPAS Reference	EPAS Title
NAT.ACC.1	- - - -	Number of aviation accidents (CAT)
NAT.ACC.2	- - - -	Number of aviation accidents (GA)
NAT.FAC.1	- - - -	Number of fatal aviation accidents (CAT)
NAT.FAC.2	- - - -	Number of fatal aviation accidents (GA)
NAT.SER.1	- - - -	Number of aviation serious incidents (CAT)
NAT.SER.2	- - - -	Number of aviation serious incidents (GA)
NAT.RE.1	- - - -	Runway Excursions
NAT.RI.1	- - - -	Runway Incursions
NAT.MAC.1	- - - -	Near misses and Mid-air collisions
NAT.CFIT.1	- - - -	Controlled flight into or towards terrain
NAT.LOCI.1	- - - -	Loss of control in flight
NAT.GCOL.1	- - - -	Ground Collision
NAT.RAMP.1	- - - -	Ground Handling operations
NAT.UAS.1	- - - -	Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

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